

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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1. REPORT NUMBER

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.

3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)

Ethics in Organizational Leadership

5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

STUDENT PAPER

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(s)

LTC(P) Raymond C. Hartjen, Jr.

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-505010. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

9. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

Same

12. REPORT DATE

May 1984

13. NUMBER OF PAGES

175

11. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)

15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

Unclassified

15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING
SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

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ETHICS IN ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

by

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond C. Hartjen, JR. USA
ARMY RESEARCH ASSOCIATE PROGRAM
United States Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA
MAY 1984

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This paper provides both a workable definition of, and examines those factors which may contribute to, an ethical dilemma in organizational leadership. To accomplish these purposes, it examines both individual ethical standards and the effects of legal demands of seniors on the ethical behaviors and standards of subordinates. The latter includes determining the ethicality of legitimate directives which demand subordinates to choose between ethical conduct and career survival in the accomplishment of given tasks. The premise is that a task that may appear to be ethical from the perspective of the leader of an organization can, in the process of being filtered and interpreted by individuals at various levels of that organization, become unethical in terms of the demands placed on the individuals who eventually have to accomplish the task. Ethical conduct may be defined as conduct which is above reproach when judged by legal and moral standards of society. For soldiers, the society is the Army; therefore, ethical conduct for those of us serving in the Army is conduct which is above reproach when judged by the legal and moral standards of the Army, standards which are frequently more stringent than those of the rest of society.

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Chapter 1

ETHICS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL LEADER

A great deal of attention is being paid to ethics and ethical conduct in the Army today. This interest is not being shown just in isolated units or in isolated geographic areas; it is being shown by everyone from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the privates serving in the most remote areas. For all the attention the subject of ethics is receiving, few guides to ethical conduct have emerged outside of the service school environment. Perhaps the greatest reasons for this absence of specific guides are the unmet requirements for an accurate definition of ethical conduct and the absence of a useable measure for what constitutes an ethical problem. The purposes of this paper are to both provide a workable definition and to examine those factors which may contribute to an ethical dilemma in organizational leadership. To accomplish these purposes, it is necessary to examine both individual ethical standards and the effects of legal demands of seniors on the ethical behaviors and standards of subordinates. The latter includes determining the ethicality of legitimate directives which demand subordinates to choose between ethical conduct and career survival in the accomplishment of given tasks. The premise is that a task that may appear to be ethical from the perspective of the leader of an organization can, in the process of being filtered and interpreted by individuals at various levels of that organization, become unethical in terms of the demands placed on the individuals who eventually have to accomplish the task.

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is conduct which is above reproach when judged by the legal and moral standards of the Army, standards which are frequently more stringent than those of the rest of society. Most of these legal and moral standards are found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Army regulations, and other implementing instructions. This makes the determination of ethical conduct appear to be a simple matter in an academic environment, but frequently the realities of the work environment seriously complicate those ethical determinations.

A colonel was asked how he defined ethical conduct for himself. He responded, "I don't lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate people who do." That sounded rather clear-cut and easy to practice. That statement of personal ethics has long been the basis for various honor codes. It has been often repeated but seldom investigated. In an attempt to analyze the personal application of that personal statement of ethical conduct, the colonel was asked the following questions:

- Have you ever told your secretary that you (or your boss) were out when someone asked to talk with you (or your boss) on the telephone?

- Have you ever taken advantage of a loop-hole in a regulation or your position in the military to get a job accomplished more quickly or to receive services (such as payment of travel vouchers) more quickly than those junior to you?

- Have you ever used government resources for other than their exact intended purpose without authorization (using left-over building materials to improve a dayroom, for instance)?

- Do you still consider your behavior ethical when measured against your own standards?

The Colonel admitted that he had responded, on occasion, inaccurately on the phone, that he did expect to receive prompt and preferential treatment based on his rank and position, and that he had diverted government resources to complete projects he considered to be important for the well-being of the members of his unit. He also said that he still considered himself to be an ethical man, but that perhaps his personal standard could use a little more definition.

The determination of what behavior is ethical and what is not may not be as simple as it appears to be at first glance, even when measured against our own standards. As the Colonel did, most of us view ourselves as being ethical in all, or nearly all, that we do. When it is suggested that some action of ours is not ethical, we are likely to take offense at the statement and respond in defense of the ethical image we hold of ourselves. That image, however, is based on our perception of our actions; others may have different perceptions. As leaders in the Armed Forces, it is our responsibility to insure that our personal behaviors are perceived by everyone to be above reproach. That task is very difficult. Even more difficult is the task of every leader to insure that, in our attempts to achieve excellence in our own performance and in the performance of our organizations, we do not create situations or environments in which subordinates are placed in a position where they must compromise their ethical standards in order to survive in the organization.

Every behavior has an ethical continuum against which it can be measured. At one end of that continuum is an absolute ethic based on law or religious dogma. At the other end is the extemporaneous ethic which says, in effect, that if it feels good, do it.

ABSOLUTE EXTEMPORANEOUS

Everything between those two poles is the situation ethic. It is in the interpretation of the situational ethic that we often encounter problems.

4

Because he was an honest man, the officer admitted that, from time to time, he did "bend the truth a bit," but never for personal gain or to save himself from the displeasure of his seniors. It was always done for a "higher good." When things went wrong, he took responsibility; when things went right, he shared the credit. In spite of his caveat, however, the fact remains that in the area of the demonstrated behavior of telling the truth, this officer professed and demanded behavior at the absolute pole and demonstrated behavior in the situational portion of the continuum.




Figure 2. Demanded vs. Demonstrated Behavior

The consequence of this variance in what was demanded and what was demonstrated in terms of truth probably was the establishment in his unit of a standard for telling the truth which fell somewhere between the absolute and the extemporaneous poles, well within the area we have labeled "situational." Lacking exact command definition of what constituted truth and observing what constituted the Colonel's "demonstrated truth," some members of the organization could be expected to arrive at a consensus in the determination of what constituted acceptable behavior for telling the

truth. This is shown in figure 3 as the belt of acceptability for the unit members. Some organizational members might not be able to arrive at a consensus, creating a situation which results in ethical confusion.




Figure 3. Limits of Acceptable Behavior

Anyone who told the truth in important matters and who never lied for personal gain would be looked upon by their peers as being ethical in terms of truthfulness. Anyone who told the truth all the time would probably be considered a zealot; anyone who lied to make himself look good or to avoid punishment would be viewed as being unethical.

As long as everyone in the organization, including the leader, knew and understands what the standards of behavior for everyone really were, there could be no problem as long as behaviors conformed to those standards. Consider, however, what can happen when individuals demonstrate behaviors

that fall outside that area considered to be acceptable. The individual who never told a lie would be looked upon with suspicion by the rest of the organization and never fully accepted into the group. He, in turn, would consider the rest of the organization to be composed of unethical liars and would probably seek ways to avoid the group. This avoidance and rejection in the group always results in conflict and stress in the organization. Similarly, an individual who has lied for personal gain or to avoid punishment would be rejected by the group because he would be viewed as being a liar. He, in turn, would look upon members of the group as zealots and seek ways to avoid them. Again, the organization would be subjected to the conflict and stress which nearly always reduces the effectiveness of the organization.

Another possibility for conflict in the unit can arise when we do not really examine the parameters of our ethical values. Using the same example of the Colonel, we can examine an instance where his inaccurate perception of his own values and demonstrated behaviors could cause problems for members of his organization.

Suppose a subordinate has been tasked to prepare a report for this officer by noon. At 11:55 he has still not finished it but he expects to have it done very soon. The First Sergeant comes into the junior officer's office and says that the Colonel wants to know where the report is. The junior officer, in a rush to complete the project, says, "Tell the Colonel I'm on the way over with it now." Two minutes later the Colonel enters the office and finds the officer completing the final paragraph of the report.

Is there a chance that the Colonel will voice his displeasure? If he does, will he be taking the subordinate to task for "bending the truth a bit," something that the Colonel admits to doing himself? If the Colonel does take the subordinate to task, is the Colonel being ethical in light of his own actions in similar circumstances, or is he just being hypocritical?

Setting ethical standards for an organization or unit is a demanding task for all leaders. Standards which fall on the absolute pole of the continuum are ideal in terms of absolute honesty and integrity; unfortunately they are also nearly impossible to attain. The establishment of unobtainable standards and the enforcement of punishments for non-attainment of these standards guarantee conflict and stress in the unit. While we need an absolute or objective ethic against which to measure our behavior, we also need to recognize and verbalize the fact that people are not perfect and, because they are not, do make mistakes or fall short of perfection. While standards of ethical conduct for the professional leader stem from various sources, and in many cases are adequate to guide and govern behavior, other situations arise in which the leader must be responsible for the interpretation or translation of standards and values into making actual choices. These situations arise in cases not covered by specific standards and in cases where two values are in conflict, such as loyalty to a fellow soldier and personal integrity to report that soldier's misdeeds. These situations call for a leader to possess the ability to exercise mature and rational thinking, to arrive at a proper decision and to take necessary action. There are also situations in which an absolute ethical rule needs to be violated for a higher good or in order to adhere to

a second absolute rule. Is it unethical, for instance, to tell a lie to a man threatening suicide in order to save his life? Kant and other philosophers who espouse his views would say that no end justifies the action, which in this case is the lie to save the life. In the leadership environment in which we live, it may make more sense to adapt a philosophy which permits the use of a situational ethic when ethical rules seemingly come into conflict.

The acceptance of the situational ethic does pose a problem in how one prioritizes obligations and ethical behaviors. Is it always right to lie to save a life? Is it sometimes acceptable? What criteria does one apply to make that determination? Perhaps the answer to these questions is not to attempt to prioritize ethical behaviors but to be accepting of the decisions of prioritization, made by others as well as ourselves. We must also accept the concept that organizational values generate formal and informal standards which in turn generate specific leader obligations.² Leaders need to model behaviors as close to the absolute ethical pole as possible, demand similar ethical behavior from subordinates, and be willing to view well-intentioned deviation from standards attainment in a situational context and accept the behaviors as a teaching and learning vehicle for subordinates.

All leaders must also be willing to accept behaviors which fall at the absolute pole of the ethical continuum, even if that acceptance requires that we must re-evaluate our own ethical values. In a speech to West Point Plebes in November 1983, LTG Carl Vuono used the following story to illustrate both the need for a well-defined personal ethical stance and the result of such a stance:

I recall the story of one young lieutenant who was assigned the rather tedious duty of inspecting expended rounds on a rifle range to insure that the primers had all been detonated before the expended brass was to be picked up and turned in. His company commander told him just to sign the certificate and get in the jeep because he was in a hurry to get back to the billets. The lieutenant informed the commander that he could not sign the certification without completing his inspection, and so his captain drove off, leaving him to do his work. For his troubles, the lieutenant got to walk back five miles to the company area, but he was never again asked to do anything dishonest by that commander, who later recommended that lieutenant to succeed him in command.

We must be ready to accept subordinates who tell us that they believe we are asking them to do something which violates their personal ethical code, and we must be equally willing to accept and pass on reports which cause us, or our units, to be looked upon less favorably than we would like. This involves a degree of risk-taking in that we must trust our seniors to accept less than perfect results without damaging our careers. While we expect this to happen in our dealings with our seniors, we must also be sensitive to the same needs and concerns in dealing with our subordinates. When honesty and trust characterize the chain of command, unit effectiveness usually improves.

In the area of ethical behavior there is no such thing as "zero defects." Problems of unethical behavior do not occur in units where ethical behavior is clearly defined, understood, and demonstrated. Problems only occur when unit members are not sure of what constitutes ethical behavior, when commanders are unrealistic in their perception of what behaviors they model and therefore demand or condone in others, or where ethical values of people at different levels in the organization differ and no command intervention is made to establish a similar standard for everyone. It is important to remember that when a standard is established

by the leader (don't lie), the leader must model that behavior absolutely. "Military professionals at mid-career and those approaching flag rank teach professional ethics by the example they provide and the policies they promulgate."³ A leader who "bends the truth a bit" in personal dealings while demanding absolute truth in subordinates sets the organization up for conflict, stress, and ultimately for inadequate performance.

Frequently leaders do not seem to understand that personal behaviors and the application of personal ethical codes are subject to the scrutiny of seniors, subordinates, and peers, not just during normal duty hours, but twenty-four hours a day. We often hear such comments as, "What I do on my time is my business," "They can tell me what to do on the job, but they can't dictate to me when I leave," and other expressions stating or implying that our behaviors are in need of being ethical only when we are on the job. Generally these statements are rationalizations for behaviors that fall short of being within the ethical belt of acceptability.

Several months ago, in a discussion of the statements in the previous paragraph among several senior officers, a comment was made that while there tended to be an attitude among a small segment of the Officer Corps supporting the need for accountability for on-duty behavior only, it really was not yet a problem. Perhaps that is what we would like to think, but there is considerable evidence to support a different argument. As of this writing, there are more than forty officers in confinement at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.⁴ The offenses for which these leaders were convicted and incarcerated include illegal drug abuse and sales, forgery (bad checks), sexual acts with children, falsifying

travel vouchers, homosexual activity, and murder; most of which took place at times other than during normal duty hours.

Ethical problems and responsibilities are not confined to the lower leadership levels. An examination of the circumstances surrounding reliefs from battalion and brigade command over the past five years indicates that alcohol abuse, sexual promiscuity, or fraternization were the leading causes. Again, these behaviors usually took place after duty hours. It is difficult to ascertain the reasons for all early retirements, dismissal from Army service, or resignation in lieu of courts martial. In one corps alone during 1980 there were 212 offenses investigated involving 133 officers serving in all grades between WO1 and Lieutenant Colonel.⁵ The statistics suggest that we do, in fact, have a problem with unethical personal behavior on the part of officers in all grades, in spite of the attention that has been placed on improving the awareness of ethical conduct and responsibilities.

ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS

In the preceding pages ethics have been examined from the point of view of individual behaviors or personal conduct. The concept of integrity is one which focuses on personal conduct and the ethical values which influence individual behavior. What has not been examined is the concept of an organizational ethic.

Organizations or units are artificial creations developed to coordinate the efforts of individuals brought together to accomplish specific tasks or to provide specific services. Organizations are conceptual in nature and

have no substance by themselves. They cannot be seen, tasted, felt or identified in any other way until people and equipment are added to give substance to the organizational concept. Because organizations are inanimate concepts, they do not come with values or ethics. Organizational values and ethics come into being when people are brought into the organizational concept.

The ethics of an organization are really the ethics of the individuals who have been brought together to give an organization substance. The leader's role in the establishment of organizational ethics is to identify





Figure 4. Limits of Acceptable Group Behavior.

and establish the parameters for the belt of acceptability for the behaviors of the individuals in the organization acting in concert, as a group. It is the leader who must clearly establish what group behaviors are acceptable just as it is the responsibility of the leader to establish what individual behaviors are acceptable in the organization. Individual behaviors must conform to societal and organizational norms; organizational ethics must conform to societal norms.



A - Absolute Ethic
 E - Extemporaneous Ethic
 S - Situational Ethic
 B/A - Belt of acceptable behavior

Figure 5. Relationship of individual and organization ethics in society.

When an individual interacts with society as a part of an organization, the organization generally assumes responsibility, at least in part, for the conduct of that individual. A football player who commits an infraction of the rules is not normally penalized as an individual; rather, the entire team is penalized. So it is with individual conduct in a corporate context. Society generally holds the organization responsible for individual breaches in ethical conduct and imposes sanctions on the organization. The organization then imposes sanctions on the individual. In cases where individual behavior is very close to the extemporaneous pole, society may choose to exercise sanctions directly against the individual, as in instances when players are ejected from a game. Society has generally opted to allow the military to exercise its own justice system in dealing with individual behavior exhibited in an organizational context which does

not conform to societal norms. The court-martial actions following disclosure of the May Lai incidents are examples of this.

The leader of an organization is responsible for three different but highly interacting, interdependent aspects of ethical behavior: (1) personal behavior, (2) organizational behavior in the societal context, and (3) organizational behaviors in the organizational context. All three aspects




Figure 6. Ethical responsibilities for organizational leaders

of ethical behavior are important, but one aspect may assume priority or greater importance over another based on the level of the organization in which the individual performs the leadership function and the environment in which the organization is functioning. A platoon leader, for instance, would be less concerned with the ethical conduct of his organization in a societal context than would be the Chief of Staff of the Army. The platoon leader would probably be more concerned with setting a personal ethical example and maintaining a work environment which fostered the ethical behavior of subordinates. That would also be the focus of commanders and other leaders at higher echelons in the Army as long as the leader and his organization continued to function completely within the military community.

The ethical conduct of an organization in a societal context becomes important to the leader of the military organization that first comes into contact with society. In order to insure the most effective functioning of an organization, a post commander, recruiting station commander, and others who operate in relative independence from higher headquarters have a real need to be concerned with the ethical conduct of their organizations in society. A person who feels that he has been exploited or taken advantage of by another will find some way to retaliate. So it is with communities that feel exploited by military organizations. Unethical behaviors, both by individuals and the organization, will insure that much of a leader's time will be spent attending to those behaviors and will not be spent on leading the organization. A recruiting station that sets up a recruiting booth outside a high school campus without coordination with the school and the community leaders will predictably experience serious problems with

recruiting in that community. Similarly, a post commander who conducts an off-post maneuver or an on-post exercise that impacts on the civilian community without prior coordination with that community can expect serious problems in community relationships. Leaders of these semi-independent organizations must operate in concert with society if they ever are to have the opportunity of becoming high-performance systems.

Standards for ethical conduct in each of the three areas of ethical concern do not vary. Behaviors are still measured against an absolute ethic for any given behavior. If it is wrong to lie for personal benefit, it is just as wrong to lie for the boss or for a subordinate. The situation becomes less clear when we try to determine the ethicality of the behavior of an officer who works so hard for his unit that he completely neglects his family. If there is an ethical problem in that situation, is the problem with the individual choice of the officer, is it with the officer's senior who permits or encourages the behavior, is the problem to be found in the institutionalized organizational value that demands total dedication to the job as a criterion for the labels of "outstanding" or is the problem to be shared among all three?

There appears to be no easy answer to these and other ethical questions. The leader in today's Army is constantly required to make decisions based on the best information available to him at the time. Most of these decisions will have ethical implications for himself, the members of his organization, and the organization as a whole. In nearly all instances, decisions can be made that can be measured for ethicality against a single absolute ethic. It is only rarely that two or more absolute

ethical rules seem to be in conflict. In any event, ethical decision-making should be based upon an analysis of facts and reasons which lead to a conclusion and a decision. When we make a decision and then support that decision with selected facts and reasons, the process is not one of ethical decision-making but rather it is one of rationalization.

Perhaps an effective means for illustrating this point is the process through which we select a new car. One way to make the decision to purchase that car is to determine the reasons or facts which support the purchase of a new car and compare them to those reasons or facts which support the retention of the old one. Once all the facts are available and comparisons are made, a logical, reasoned decision can be made. Another way to make the purchase decision is to see the car, decide to make the purchase, and then gather all the facts that support that decision. That is not a logical, reasoned decision but a rationalization for an emotional response to the new car. The same choices are available to us in making ethical decisions in and for our organization.

Chapter 2

ETHICS IN THE ORGANIZATION

A basic assumption among members of a high performance team or system is that all members of the team all on the same side, working towards a common goal. There can be no "we" and "them" in the problem-solving process. High performance teams can tolerate and even take pride in the motivations and actions of an eccentric member of the team. Leaders of high performance teams guide and direct their organizations by coaching and personal example. Members of the team work together in the organization and receive their major motivation to continue in the team from a sense of contribution to meeting organizational goals, the comeraderie generated among the team members, and a recognition of their own strong positive self-worth reinforced by members of the team, its leader, and the organization.

If it were possible to dissect a high-performance team to discover the secrets of its functioning, the formal and informal communications networks in the team could be compared to any other structured communications network, be it the nervous system of man or a complex telephonic or computer system. For actions to take place, demands must be made on members of the team. Expectations and guidance from the leader must be clear, complete, and understood by members of team. In behavioristic terms, these leader inputs are the stimuli that cause actions to take place in the team. Clear and complete guidance or inputs from the leader contribute heavily to the probability that team actions will conform to the expectations of the leader.

Communications systems are two-way. For the team to act or perform in such a way as to meet the expectations of the leader, the demands of the

leader must be clear and complete. A filtration or editing of the demand could result in input distortion which would effect the team product. Similarly, team feedback to the leader must be clear and complete if the leader is expected to make appropriate adjustments to the demands and insure a team product that meets organizational requirements. Again, filtration or editing of team feedback can result in distortion that influences leader demand adjustment. Figure 7 illustrates this process.




Figure 7. Communications process.

If the communications process shown in figure 7 is interrupted or distorted, greater feedback and adjustment requirements are generated in order to produce the expected team products. Any number of things can induce this distortion or interruption. Leader and team interpretation or organizational demands, team-member fear of giving negative but accurate feedback, and organization and leader-generated unnecessary adjustments are all examples of causal factors for distortion or interruption in the

communications process. There are many more. Regardless of the causal factor, the end result is nearly always the same: the team ceases to be a high-performance system and team efficiency and productivity are threatened.

Organizational goals are seldom ethical or unethical when viewed separately. Ethical consideration generally enter the equation when organizational goals are translated into demands transmitted to subordinate leaders, teams, and individuals. Of course there are exceptions to this. One might justly question the ethicality/morality of an organizational or national goal of genocide for an ethnic group. It is possible, therefore, for an ethical dilemma to originate with the identification of an organizational goal.

Perhaps the greatest ethical concerns in organizational leadership are in the communication of ethical goals and in generating demands for accomplishing those goals that do not cause subordinates to violate personal ethical codes or demand behaviors which fall outside of the organizational belt of acceptability. To facilitate the accomplishment of organizational goals in an ethical context, these six leader actions are necessary:

1. Make an analysis of the situation or of the task to be accomplished.
2. Decide on a definite course of action.
3. Give clear guidance and instructions to subordinates.
4. Provide adequate resources to accomplish the task.
5. Be receptive to feedback.
6. Check progress and results for conformity to guidance.

If each of these actions is accomplished, subordinates are not likely to be confronted by an ethical dilemma in the process of accomplishing an organizational goal.

Perhaps a case study would be useful to illustrate the importance of the leader actions listed above.

Several years ago an armored division was activated using tanks that had spent an extended period in outside storage. These armored vehicles had a lot of leaking seals and their wiring harnesses were crumbling. Because the division was required to support tests of new warfare concepts and equipment, there was considerable pressure brought to bear upon the tank battalions to maintain high equipment availability rates. As a result of heavy mission requirements, units of the division spent a lot of time in the field. Every time a battalion went to the field it would experience one or more tank engine compartment fires of varying degrees of severity caused by the shorting of electrical components.

After several months of viewing a steady stream of vehicle fire reports, the commanding general issued a message to all units in the division that he would not tolerate any further tank fires. The following week a battalion went to the field and promptly experienced three engine compartment fires, all in the same company and all within a matter of minutes of each other. The company commander (a much-decorated, combat-experienced officer) quickly reported the fires, made temporary repairs on the vehicles and continued with his mission. When the reports of the fires reached the commanding general, the battalion and brigade commanders had to argue strongly to keep the company commander from being relieved. In any event, a letter of reprimand from the general was given to the company commander and was made a part of his permanent record.

As would be expected, the effect of the general's reaction to the fires had a profound impact. Unit commanders did not feel free to report vehicles with poor wiring harnesses as being inoperable and no parts were available to make repairs. Repairs in this instance consisted of rewiring the entire engine compartment, a task far too complex to be accomplished in a battalion motor pool. No more engine compartment fires were reported, however. Instead, units reported massive shorts and very rapid oxidations in engine compartment electrical components. Fires did not stop; only fire reporting stopped.¹

The ethical implications of this case are many, and the impact of this incident on the attitudes of the soldiers who served in that division during that period is still being felt. Some began to believe that it was smart to "bend the truth a bit" to prevent early termination of their careers. Others formed or reinforced a negative opinion of the Army and left at the first opportunity. Others remained in the Army and fought to develop professional ethical standards. The commanding general eventually retired.

The tank fires case brings into focus the need for the use of the six leader actions in goal-setting if subordinates are to be spared the ethical conflict that is generated by the requirement to choose between career and the maintenance of high ethical standards. If the incident recounted above could be relived in a scenario in which the commanding general followed the actions listed earlier, perhaps the outcome would be different.

MAKE AN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION OR OF THE TASK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. When any leader receives a task to perform, he needs to analyze it to determine (1) exactly what is desired, (2) any implied associated tasks to

be performed, (3) what resources (time, money, people, facilities) are required, (4) the capability of the team to perform the task, (5) what the priority of the task is, and (6) what work stops so that this task can be accomplished if no additional resources are available. Once this is accomplished, he needs to determine the ways in which the task could be accomplished and identify and compare the strengths and weaknesses of each course of action. Sometimes the leader does these steps himself; at other times he may desire that selected members of the team work with him during the task analysis stage. In the tank fire case, the commanding general became alarmed at the increasing number of engine compartment fires. He did determine exactly what he desired (an end to all tank fires). He did not determine that there was an implied associated task to be performed of rewiring all the tanks. He never thought of what resources would be required to eliminate fires; rather, he relied on "command pressure" to solve the tank fire problem. Had the general made a thorough analysis of the problem, he would have had to determine the priority for the rewiring task and would have been forced to make a choice between rewiring the tanks and performing his test support mission.

DETERMINE A DEFINITE COURSE OF ACTION. This action is one of decision-making, the selection of the most appropriate course of action based on an analysis of the problem, resource availability, mission priority, and the ability of the organization to perform the task. In this particular case, the commanding general could have accepted a lower vehicle availability rate and instituted a systematic rewiring program to be performed by support maintenance activities. He also could have accepted

the possibility of tank fires as one of the risks associated with operating substandard equipment. Instead, the general adopted a definite course of action based on legitimate and coercive power² derived from his position in the organization rather than on a positive course of action designed to eliminate the cause of the problem.

GIVE CLEAR GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATES. In addition to the requirement to issue clear guidance and instructions to subordinates in order to accomplish the organizational task, a brief description of the importance of the task to the overall operation of the organization is helpful in allowing subordinates to more fully understand the priority affixed to the task and in allowing subordinates to generate useful feedback to the leader when problems arise in task completion or in priority of action. What would have happened if the general said something like this: "We have two main missions: to keep the division combat-ready and to support doctrine and equipment testing. At the moment the second mission has priority. I want a tank engine compartment rewiring program instituted that will allow for a 90% (or 80%, or 50%) armored vehicle availability rate in support of those missions. Until the rewiring program is completed, I want subordinate commanders to look for ways to reduce the instances of tank fires and to share any ideas that they have on the subject with me and the rest of the commanders." It is quite possible that not only would subordinates not have been caught in an ethical dilemma, but that the actual tank fire incident rate would have decreased.

PROVIDE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK. This is one of the most important factors in ethical leadership and one of the most often

ignored. Resources consist of more than money. Other essential resources are the people required to perform the task, the time in which to do it, the facilities in which the task is to be performed, and the equipment required to carry out the mission. In our example the commanding general provided none of these. We all know of other examples. One year the Army Training Plan was virtually unresourced. The general officer responsible for the plan told his subordinates to prepare the plan; he would worry about the resources. Apparently he never did.³ The result of this failure to properly resource the Army Training Plan was that countless posts and stations were forced into an ethical dilemma in which commanders had to either cut necessary services and programs already in existence or ignore the training plan. Compromises could have been made and probably were. Training course lengths could have been shortened, tasks could have been delayed, and personnel could be worked longer hours. These compromises, however, also tend to force the ethical dilemma to lower leadership levels.

BE RECEPTIVE TO FEEDBACK. Feedback can be either positive or negative. In an advisory relationship, where there is a "we" and a "they", there is a tendency to view negative feedback as a personal comment on the worth of the leader. It is more difficult to document a case in which a leader took offense to positive feedback. Even in a high performing team where there is no advisory relationship, negative feedback is not always welcome. On occasion there may be a desire to "shoot the messenger;" however, such an action does nothing to alter the situation. What negative feedback really communicates is that a problem in the accomplishing of organizational tasks is either present or in the process of developing. Subordinates who fear

being shot, literally or figuratively, for reporting the development of a problem will tend to delay the report or to distort the report in such a way as to camouflage the problem or spread blame so that any one individual cannot be held responsible. This delay or distortion is dysfunctional to the organization because it demands the prostitution of personal ethical standards and because it allows problems to become larger before they are finally recognized. In the prostitution of personal ethical standards, subordinates who are caught in delaying or distorting information are generally punished for that behavior. The leader who demanded that distortion or delay of information by reinforcing the perception that bad news is unwelcome is rarely punished. Who really has the greatest ethical problem, the leader who demands unethical behavior for subordinate career survival or the subordinate who demonstrates the behavior in response to the leader's verbal or non-verbal demand? In the tank fire case, it was the commanding general's demand that resulted in the distortion of tank fire reports by subordinates.

CHECK PROGRESS AND RESULTS FOR CONFORMITY TO GUIDANCE. Everyone knows that the organization does well that which the leader checks. Supervision is a normal leader function and does not need to be investigated in great detail here. Leaders need to do more than supervise; they must also check to see if the results of the labors of the members of the organization meet the expectations of the leader, or, if they do not, why they do not. The checking is essentially first-person feedback on the clarity and appropriateness of the leader's guidance. The opening sentence of this chapter declared that a basic assumption among members of a high-performance

team is that all members of the team are on the same side, working towards common goals. Checking and supervision must be done in such a way that this assumption is reinforced, otherwise the non-verbal communication sent to members of the team is that the leader does not trust the team members to do a good job in the leader's absence. A communication of this sort can quickly kill innovation and initiative among subordinates who must one day assume leadership roles in the organization.

Leaders need to remember that guidance normally pertains to the description of desired results. Process decisions, or the manner in which those results are to be achieved, are generally best left to subordinates. This allows them to develop their own analytic skills and to feel that they have an important role to play in the accomplishment of organizational tasks. There is a propensity among officers in the upper leadership levels to assume that there is a best way to accomplish a task. Leaders should constantly remind themselves that, in fact, there is more than one correct solution or course of action to any problem; that the game need not always be played according to their rules. The long-term benefits of allowing subordinates to make decisions in accomplishing organizational missions may far outweigh the short-term importance of the task itself.⁴ If the commanding general in the Tank Fire case had really followed up on his demand for an end to tank fires, he would have discovered that the problem had not been resolved and that other, more appropriate leader actions were required.

In the normal process of evaluating the results of the organization's efforts to accomplish a specific task or mission, the leader should go back

to the first of the leader actions, an analysis of the situation. If the goal has been met, the leader can turn his attention elsewhere. If the goal has not been met, he can make adjustments to his initial guidance and go through the leader steps again and again until the task is finally accomplished to his satisfaction or is abandoned.

Legal and ethical demands on subordinate behavior have a number of organizational and personal effects. Just as we assume that all members of a high performance team are on the same side, so it is that we must make a basic assumption that the leader of an organization of any size is ethical in his personal conduct and wants to be ethical in his corporate conduct as well. Of course there are exceptions to this, but most leaders want to be ethical and want their subordinates to be ethical, too. Since we have had so many problems with unethical conduct over the past few years, we might well ask the question of what went wrong. Are leaders demanding unethical behaviors or are subordinates just unethical? Perhaps neither alternative is accurate. Perhaps as legal and ethical demands are filtered and interpreted as they sift through the various levels of organizational structure they acquire a different ethical characteristic when they reach the level at which the action is to take place. The filterings and interpretations could all be done in good faith; however, an originally ethical demand could still become unethical in terms of demands placed upon the accomplisher of the task.

Few people who have served in Recruiting Command will argue with the statement that such service is among the most stressful and demanding in the

Army today. In a volunteer Army context, a strong economy means hard times for the recruiter; a weak economy means that the recruiter has a less difficult task in meeting his recruiting objective. Periodically the Recruiting Command unearths unethical recruiting practices and takes steps to eliminate those practices everywhere in the organization. Ethical problems in the past few years have included programming fictitious people into computers for desirable military occupational specialties in order to reserve a highly "saleable" enlistment option until a qualified person can be found to fill the vacancy, recruiting in juvenile court, making arrangements with judges to offer military service as an alternative to conviction and imprisonment, cheating on mental examinations, recruiters advising potential recruits to withhold disqualifying information, and the manufacture and sale of bogus high school graduation certificates. The thought is that the corrective actions eliminate the problem. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be that the corrective actions eliminate the symptoms, at least for a while. It is quite possible that the problem is never really addressed. It is unlikely that so many unethical people would be assigned to one command on a consistent basis. It is more probable that as the recruiting demand filters through the command, the requirement to meet the objective overwhelms the individuals need for ethical conduct.

A highly simplistic analysis of the problem which results in unethical recruiting practices might go like this. Army manpower needs are determined and recruiting requirements are identified. Recruiting Command determines the recruiting objectives for recruiting regions, who in turn determine objectives for districts. District Recruiting commands determine objectives

for recruiting areas and so on until at long last the individual recruiter has his objective. The establishment of recruiting objectives or goals is not, in itself, unethical. Certainly the Army needs qualified personnel in sufficient numbers to accomplish its missions. Goals and objectives are a way to set some measurement against which recruiters can measure the success of their efforts. What then, accounts for unethical recruiting practices? The most likely argument is that organizational sanctions for failure to meet objectives are the greatest contributors to the demands for unethical behavior.

A non-commissioned officer recruiter attends special schooling, is awarded a separate military occupational specialty, and draws additional pay for recruiting duty. Consistent failure to meet recruiting objectives generally results in relief from recruiting duty, an annotation in the recruiter's record precluding assignment to any future recruiting duty, and an efficiency report that will not allow him to be competitive for promotion. The recruiter feels pressured because he is being rated on his ability to sell the concept of serving one's country to others instead of being rated by tangible criteria over which he has absolute control. To him, failure to meet objectives means the loss of his career. His personal need for success is great. This situation would be difficult enough if all recruiters were volunteers for the duty; however, frequently top-quality non-commissioned officers are assigned to such duty against their wills. The demand for success for these recruiters is felt even more keenly.

If the demand for recruits is ethical, and if the sanctions for failure to meet recruiting objectives precipitate an ethical dilemma between career

survival and unethical conduct, at which level in the organization is the problem first manifested? Commanders at all levels, both officers and non-commissioned officers, are subject to the sanction of removal for failure to meet objectives. It is most likely that District Recruiting Commanders, Area Commanders, Station commanders and individual recruiters would be the recipients of such sanctions, but the problem would begin at the level at which the most senior man would feel that his career was in jeopardy if the recruiting objective were not met.

This example is not meant as an indictment of the recruiting command or any man or woman serving in it; rather, it is meant to illustrate the organizational pressures which eventually lead to individual unethical behavior. It is also meant to identify the difficult problem of determining the exact level in the organization at which an ethical demand generates sufficient pressure on subordinates that unethical behavior becomes the more attractive alternative.

If organizational sanctions are the catalyst for unethical behaviors, there are several other factors that are contributors to the creation of ethical dilemmas. One of these is a conflict between two absolute values or ethics. A senior leader who assigns a mission to a subordinate leader who has inadequate resources to perform the task places the subordinate in a position where difficult choices must be made because of a conflict generated between the ethic of accomplishing every mission well and the ethic of looking out for the welfare of subordinates and the organization. The subordinate leader can request additional resources. The negative fantasy attached to that course of action is that no additional resources

would be available anyway and the senior may view the subordinate as being non-supportive or inadequate in his ability to cause a job to be done. Another course of action open to the subordinate is to refuse the mission, with the same resulting negative fantasy. Yet a third course of action is to accept the mission and pass it along to subordinates, who in turn are placed in the same ethical dilemma. Still another course of action is to terminate other on-going projects in order to accomplish the new task. This course of action may generate turmoil in the organization, frustration among subordinates, and contribute to a lessening in organizational effectiveness.

At this point the subordinate leader can go through a rational decision-making process and arrive at a conclusion. Organizational sanctions which could negatively impact on the leader's career might argue in favor of accepting the mission without question and passing the task and the dilemma along to subordinates or compromising the quality of the product demanded by the mission. The ability to provide negative feedback to the senior leader could argue in favor of requesting additional resources or prioritizing tasks to be accomplished.

Doing the right thing and supporting the boss are two ethics that constantly conflict. Most people want to do what is right or ethical. Military leaders have been taught since entry into the service that a good leader is one who is absolutely loyal to his senior and his subordinates. Frequently, however, the commitment to loyalty to subordinates fades when stress is applied to the leader. Take the following situation that took place in Europe during the 1970s. A division commander was determined that his division would win the USAREUR and 7th Army reenlistment award by having

the highest number of reenlistments. The commander reportedly communicated to his staff that failure to win the trophy was totally unacceptable. To insure success, unit reenlistment personnel searched the existing regulations for loopholes that would give their division an advantage over other organizations. They discovered that first-enlistment soldiers would reenlist immediately upon arriving in Europe for a guarantee of completing the enlistment in Europe. The reenlistment personnel immediately began to counsel the newly-arrived soldiers of this option and guarantee of tour stability. What they did not mention was that these new soldiers would most likely spend the next 36 months or the remainder of their enlistments in Europe even if they did not reenlist. They also did not mention to the new soldiers that early reenlistment would cause them to lose thousands of dollars in reenlistment bonuses as well as the opportunity to reenlist for more desirable military occupational specialties. Every quarter the coveted trophy was awarded to the division. Other unit reenlistment personnel discovered how this division consistently won the competition but did not succumb to the temptation to place a trophy on their commanding general's wall at the expense of the soldiers serving in their units. Yes, the general and his staff won if the trophy was a measure of success. The losers, however, were not the other divisions but rather were the soldiers in his own organization.⁵

Competition frequently is a factor which contributes to an ethical dilemma. Winning a competition implies that there must be one or more losers. No leader wants to be viewed as a loser at anything. Reenlistment contests originate to help keep highly-qualified soldiers in the Army; in

the case above that competition lead to some very unethical conduct. Most career soldiers have served in battalions or seen battalions in which sports competitions were taken so seriously that players were excused from duty in order to practice, which detracted from squad and crew proficiency. Post rifle, pistol and athletic teams remove soldiers from their primary job, all in the name of competition.

The maintenance of any statistical performance data implies a formal or informal competition to subordinates who have to compete for promotion and for jobs and schools that enhance the possibility of promotion, especially when promotion is required for retention in the organization. Job security and retirement are contingent upon winning the competition for promotion. The stakes for this competition are high and the conflict between the need for ethical conduct and the need for winning can be great. All competition can create this ethical dilemma. Even competition involving military training opens the door to unethical practices. For years target ranges have been memorized or written on range finders so that tank commanders could have a better chance of attaining high scores on tank crew qualification courses. Competitions among company supply rooms in one brigade led at one time to attempts to bribe inspectors and at another to inspectors settling grudges at inspection time. At a higher level, competition among units led to a complete prostitution of the unit readiness reporting system throughout the Army.

What is it about competition that contributes to ethical dilemmas? The simple act of competition, by itself, is not a contributor to unethical conduct. In fact, competition can be very useful in terms of increased

productivity, proficiency in individual and crew tasks, and in the development of esprit and cohesion in units. Competition can become dysfunctional to ethical behavior when rewards for winning are significant, when sanctions for not winning are perceived or imposed, and when statistics based on the competition are generated and maintained.

Significant rewards for winning competitions can lead to unethical individual behavior. Greed and other human weaknesses or character flaws can become more evident when there is a chance for tangible rewards. What constitutes a significant reward varies with the individuals involved in the situation. A savings bond in a soldier of the quarter competition, a medal for recruiters who exceed recruiting goals, a trophy for winning a divisional reenlistment competition, and a prize for academic excellence in a service school can all contribute to unethical conduct by individuals if they perceive that the value of the reward is greater than the probability of being caught or punished for unethical behavior.

Sanctions for not winning can also take many forms. Withholding a pass for not winning an inspection competition, the perception that failure to win will result in a lower efficiency report, performance counseling that concentrates on winning rather than on improving performance, failure to reinforce positive behaviors while addressing negative behaviors, inconsistency between what the leaders in the organization say constitutes success and what subordinates perceive to constitute success, the perception that rewards are contingent upon winning and that the withholding of those rewards constitutes a sanction for losing, and the very act of acquiring the label of loser are all examples of real or perceived sanctions for not

winning that contribute to ethical dilemmas. Unethical behavior can result when an individual believes that the punishment for not winning is greater than the chance of being caught in unethical behavior.

Statistics generated from competition remain to haunt individuals and organizations long after the competition is forgotten. The fact that the lowest-scoring unit in a supply room inspection had no supply sergeant for three months prior to the inspection when all the other competitors did may not be remembered months later when a senior rater is deciding the rank order of a departing commander. The modern computerized Army is statistic-oriented and commanders have a tendency to base determinations of efficiency on statistics rather than on an analysis of performance based on resources. Statistics are empirical; rebuttal of conclusions drawn from statistical data based on circumstantial factors is generally a no-win situation for the individual doing the rebutting. The probability of the rebuttal being perceived as an excuse for poor or inadequate performance is generally greater than the probability of changing a statistically-based conclusion. This leaves the individual with a single viable option for improving the senior's perception of his efficiency: improve the statistic against which he is being measured.

The actions organizational leaders can take to insure that competition contributes only to the positive aspects of ethical behavior are several. Perhaps the most positive competition from an organizational perspective is one in which individuals compete largely against themselves, much as a golfer competes against his own best scores. This competition is one in which increased performance is encouraged by internal rewards to the

individual. Competitions among organizational members can be organizationally functional if rewards are only tokens and sanctions are non-existent. If statistics based on competition results are kept, subordinates will perceive a reward in the form of career enhancement for winning and a sanction in the form of career degradation for not winning.

Can an organization be run efficiently without the maintenance of statistical performance data? Perhaps some can; others cannot. If ethical conduct is to be encouraged among organizational members, organizational leaders need to treat statistical data in a way that is perceived by the members to be non-threatening to their careers. To do this, perhaps reward system based on "how the game is played" rather than on winning or losing would best facilitate ethical conduct.

Other conditions that contribute to an ethical dilemma include a failure to clarify organizational requirements, needs, demands or goals; the failure to prioritize actions or missions; failure to seek (or allocate) adequate resources to perform a given task or mission; a fear of saying "no" or of refusing a tasking; the failure to acknowledge that resources are fully committed; and the anticipation of un verbalized possible future organizational needs by premature allocation of resources. Most of the conditions listed are opposites for the necessary leader actions discussed earlier. The anticipation of un verbalized future needs by premature allocation of resources is an area in which many ethical dilemmas took place at Fort Hood several years ago. Each major organization had a certain amount of money allocated for the purchase of repair parts. Requisitions for repair parts were cancelled after thirty days and had to be reordered.

Frequently the repair parts supply system took longer to process the requestions and cancellations than the thirty days allowed. This resulted in the unit receiving two parts instead of the one that was needed. This situation was not a problem because the extra part could be returned to the supply system. The problem arose when the unit was credited with only ten percent of cost of the returned part. In effect a unit that received a double issue and returned a part was charged 190 percent for the part they used. Maintenance officers and commanders were then placed in a position where they could accept a ten percent rebate for returning the part or hide the extra part with the expectation that they would need the part in the future. The second alternative had severe supply system implications and violated several policies and regulations. It also fostered a flea market system of parts bartering among units. The ethical problem was caused by well-meaning but unrealistic supply parts policies and regulations that placed using units in a no-win situation. Other examples of premature resource allocation include padding projected budgets, manufacturing missions to keep unneeded personnel employed, and the preparation of unsolicited studies or papers just in case a senior might ask for the information.

ETHICAL PERCEPTIONS

In a 1970 Army War College study⁶, a survey of attitudes in the Army among the officers determined, in part, that senior officers largely went unpunished when caught in unethical conduct, that general officers tended to demand absolutely ethical conduct while demonstrating unethical conduct and

that senior officers tended to view themselves as paragons of virtue while they viewed their subordinates as being unethical if left to their own devices. A follow-on study⁷ in 1978 indicated a perceptual shift in that both seniors and subordinates tended to view each other as being more ethical than had the respondents to the earlier survey. An opinion survey conducted for this paper from randomly-selected lieutenant colonels and colonels assigned to three major posts in the United States⁸ indicated a concern for ethical issues, an acknowledgement that attitudes of seniors influence the ethical behavior of subordinates, and reinforced the earlier perception that unethical behavior demonstrated by general officers goes unpunished, is covered up, or may even be rewarded. The majority of those officers surveyed concurred in the perception that unethical behavior that would result in incarceration for colonels and other subordinate officers would at worst result in retirement for general officers who exhibited those same behaviors. The implication of this perception is that a double standard for ethical behaviors exists and is condoned by the organization, and that the standards for these behaviors change between the ranks of colonel and brigadier general.

This perception that there are two standards against which conduct is measured for ethicality need not be true in order for it to have a negative impact on attitudes, morale, and ethical values of the members of an organization. When the perception exists, subordinates tend to conform to directives in order to avoid sanctions rather than because they believe in the correctness or rightness of the action. People who behave in a way that avoids sanctions generally are not committed to a task and tend to change

their behavior when the leadership changes. For a concept to become institutionalized, subordinates need to believe in its correctness. When this occurs, the concept will survive a leadership change in the organization.

For the past several years a concerted effort has been made to eliminate obesity from the ranks of the Army. Strict standards have been established and harsh sanctions have been imposed for non-conformity to those standards. Sanctions include non-selection for promotion and essential military schooling, adverse efficiency reports, and involuntary separation from the Army, frequently without retirement benefits. The concept of a physically-fit Army has flourished under three chiefs of staff, but there are indications that if successive chiefs of staff did not emphasize the fitness program, obesity would once again swell among the ranks of the Army. During the course of gathering material for this paper, colonels and lieutenant colonels were asked for their thoughts concerning the ethicality of an enforced weight standard. Combat Arms and combat support officers nearly all voiced this opinion that the weight standard was only one facet of the overall Army physical fitness program and that insistence on the meeting of high standards in this program was ethical because the physical fitness of soldiers could influence survival on the battlefield. Combat service support officers tended to be mixed in responses that ranged from conformation to the opinions of the Combat Arms officers to the opinion that the whole fitness program was unethical because it detracted from primary mission time.

These same officers were then presented with a hypothetical situation calling for a determination of the ethicality of a described behavior. The situation described was this:

The Army has established strict weight standards. Would it be ethical for a senior commander who is grossly overweight to allow soldiers from his command to be discharged from the Army for non-compliance with the weight standards? Is it ethical for the obese commander to be retained in command while subordinates are penalized or eliminated from the Army for obesity?

The responses to these questions were mixed. Approximately half of the officers questioned responded that there was an ethical problem identified in both questions. Several of the other officers said that they thought they knew the senior officer referenced in the question and that his outstanding qualities and immense capability for high performance more than compensated for his obesity. The remainder of the officers questioned declined to comment. Among those officers who projected a name to the commander in the questions there seemed to be a consensus that by the time an officer reached senior rank he was, in fact, exempt from the standard organizational rules of behavior and should be measured against some other, unspecified standard.

A conclusion to be drawn from the responses may be that institutionalization of the weight standard requires all officers to believe in and to comply with those standards. A more important conclusion to be drawn is that there still exists in the Army a perception that dual or multiple organizational standards exist for measuring the ethicality of behavior. This suggests that subordinates may comply with standards to avoid sanctions rather than because a given action is right or wrong, a condition which ultimately precludes the development of a high-performance system.

CAREERISM

In a conflict between doing what is right and doing what is situationally expedient, a real danger exists that expediency may take priority over ethicality. Urgency may cloud the moral basis for our behavior and even our very existence. Leaders who make organizational decisions based on situational expediency rather than on ethicality may be more concerned with careerism than with professionalism. Careerism and professionalism have been defined in many ways, but for the purposes of this paper careerism is behavior designed to advance the individual in the organization or to meet his personal needs while professionalism is meeting the needs of the organization before addressing personal needs. Selfless service is a phrase often used to describe professionalism. Most career soldiers like to think of themselves as being professional. In fact, most career soldiers demonstrate both careerism and professionalism almost daily.

Careerism has a number of causes. Organizational structure is a contributor in that it allows for only a limited number of the people in the organization to rise to top leadership positions. The competition that this fact spawns among organizational members to achieve those high positions is also a contributor. This competition is not like an athletic competition in which contestants gather to decide the winners and the losers for a single event. Competition for career soldiers is one of records and reputations, where the consequences of actions that occur when a leader is a junior officer influences selection for senior positions years later. The perception persists that competition among lieutenant colonel for promotion to colonel begins among lieutenants. This generates a belief among leaders

that a mistake or error at any point in a career could have an adverse impact on that career many years later.

The perception that success in the organization is dependent upon having the right jobs at the proper times in a career is another factor that contributes to careerism. Another contributor is the dichotomy that exists between espoused personnel management policy and that which really happens. "Any job is a good job if you perform well" is a statement that has been used for years by personnel managers who hope to fill undesirable positions in the organizational structure. The reality of career progression is that primary staff and command positions can enhance a career, while many special staff positions can, at best, be considered neutral in terms of career progression. One needs only to compare relative selection rates for attendance at senior service colleges and for promotion to colonel between those lieutenant colonels in the combat arms who have had battalion command and those who have not to gain an understanding of the importance for holding the right jobs at the proper times. This situation causes junior officers to manipulate for good jobs early in their careers in the hopes that they will be selected for key assignments as senior officers.

How is this dysfunctional to the organization? First of all, unrealistic personnel management policies and statements contribute to an attitude of creeping cynicism for all personnel management practices. Leaders begin to lose faith in the organizational system that they perceive to be allowing their careers to stagnate. Secondly, many fine officers who cannot be selected for key assignments or promotion simply because sufficient vacancies in the organization do not exist perceive that the

organization is sending them a signal that they have no further use in the military, so they opt for early retirement. The experience and expertise lost each year to the Army through premature retirement is tremendous. Finally, the manipulation and competition that starts among junior officers for important and career-enhancing jobs starts a pattern of behavior in which officers become more concerned with fostering their own career development than in meeting the needs of the Army. Once this mind-set has been established, it is very difficult to change.

What can be done to reduce careerism and foster professionalism? The list of required actions is long, but perhaps a few of the more important should be listed here. These include:

1. Developing and distributing an order of merit list for all leaders in each grade so that each leader can accurately assess his or her performance record in comparison to other peers.
2. Developing and implementing a performance reporting system that accurately summarizes individual duty performance and promotion potential.
3. Providing and following guidance to those who rate leader performance concerning ratings and their consequences to the rated officers. For instance, raters should be told what sort of ratings will facilitate a subordinate leader's promotion, selection for a key service school, or his elimination from the Army.
4. Selecting leaders for promotion and for command assignments in sequence based on their position in the order of merit list for their grade and experience. This would eliminate secondary promotion zones while insuring that those officers with the highest potential for successfully

assuming increased responsibilities would be promoted first. It could also eliminate costly promotion boards and do much to change the perception that promotion or command is contingent upon knowing someone on the promotion or selection board.

5. Basing order of merit standings on job performance in the present and previous grade or for the last five years so that leaders who were slow in developing or who made well-intentioned errors early in their careers would have the opportunity to be judged for performance potential on recent performance of duty. Similarly, leaders whose performance potential peaked early in their careers would not be carried into successive promotions based on long-past exploits.

6. Separating promotion from retention in the Army. Unhealthy competition and careerism are fostered by systems in which retention in the organization is contingent upon promotion.

7. Continuing to de-emphasize the source of commission for leaders while emphasizing job performance as the key to promotion and selection for jobs of critical importance to the organization.

8. Measuring leader job performance by the performance of the organization under the direction of the leader. The development and performance of subordinates is the most accurate reflection of a leader's effectiveness.

9. Eliminating from the Army those officers in any grade who violate ethical standards. Discontinue the policy of quiet retirement or resignation in lieu of prosecution for unethical or illegal conduct.

10. Insuring that policies that are espoused by the organization are really followed at all levels in that organization. Policies that cannot be followed or enforced should be eliminated to eliminate ethical dilemmas for subordinates.

11. Continuing to emphasize and reward selfless service while penalizing those leaders whose actions are self-serving. Manipulating job assignments, exploiting subordinates, and requesting personal favors can all be examples of self-serving behaviors.

12. Concentrating leader efforts on enhancing the ability of subordinates to perform basic missions. Soldiers come into the military to be soldiers. They expect hardships and they deserve to develop the pride that comes from overcoming those hardships. A well-manicured lawn may be a beautiful sight, but it does not necessarily mean that the unit that owns that lawn is prepared to accomplish its mission in combat. Non-mission essential tasks accomplished at the expense of mission preparation are frequently performed to meet the needs of the leader, not the needs of the organization or the nation. That is the epitome of careerism.

This list is certainly not all-inclusive. Many other actions are required to eliminate careerism and foster professionalism. The responsibility of leaders, especially senior leaders, is to change those systemic conditions that demand or foster careerism among subordinates. This requires that all policies, regulations and other directions that have the force of law be re-evaluated, not only for their ability to accomplish a specific purpose, but also for their potential for placing subordinates in an ethical dilemma or for fostering careerism among subordinate leaders.

CHAPTER 3

COMMUNICATIONS

Leaders lead by communicating with subordinates. These communications take many forms, but they can generally be classified as verbal or non-verbal in nature. Verbal communications transmit intentional messages by any number of means to seniors peers and subordinates. These messages generally have a common meaning to those who receive them, hopefully the same meaning that was intended by the sender. This is not the case with non-verbal communications. Non-verbal communications are implied by the sender and perceived by the recipient. A non-verbal message may be transmitted intentionally or unintentionally by the sender. A leader who tells a subordinate, "I don't care how you do it, just get it done," may be perceived by the subordinate to be telling him to do whatever is necessary to accomplish the task, regardless of the ethicality of the action. The verbal message was to accomplish the task, the non-verbal message was an implied condoning of unethical behavior. Frowning at the messenger who brings unwelcome news may non-verbally communicate an unwillingness to receive bad news, a perception which can eliminate feedback and generate myriad organizational problems. Showing up late for a briefing can communicate disinterest in the subject; constant tardiness for briefings can communicate incompetence, self-centeredness or lack of concern for the time and welfare of subordinates.

Because communications are essential to the leader in the performance of his leadership function, every precaution must be taken to insure the leaders ability to send and receive verbal messages. Leaders and

subordinates must also be aware of what non-verbal messages are being sent or are perceived as being sent. The form of communication most likely to create an ethical dilemma in the organization is that which is non-verbal. Greater reliance is placed on non-verbal communications when verbal communications are impeded. Subordinates who perceive that a leader is not receptive to receiving unfavorable news tend to distort, delay or withhold that information if the non-verbal communication they received when delivering unfavorable news in the past was that they, not the news, were not satisfactory. In an atmosphere or climate where subordinates feel free to communicate both good and bad news to the leader, communications tend to be accurate and timely. Leaders then have the opportunity to make decisions based on accurate data and not on delayed, distorted, or inaccurate information. The positive organizational implications to be drawn from an unimpeded communications system that allows decisions to be made based on accurate and timely information are many. The probability of the organization developing into a high-performing system is greatly enhanced, while an impeded communications system guarantees a lessening in organizational effectiveness and efficiency.

Organizations that allow and encourage unimpeded information exchange also allow subordinates to voice concerns over the ethical implications of individual or collective decisions and actions. All leaders have an obligation to exhibit ethical behavior personally and to voice concern over the behavior of others that they consider to be unethical or over organizational decisions and policies that have perceived unethical implications for members of the organization and the society it serves. In

order for this feedback to occur, leaders at all levels need to take the following actions: (1) Encourage and reward honest communication of feelings and attitudes, especially those with ethical implications. (2) View negative feedback as an opportunity for learning rather than as a personal threat or condemnation. (3) Investigate the ethical implications of policies, regulations and other directives with subordinates and make changes in those rules when appropriate. (4) Tolerate honest dissent or difference of opinion without penalizing the individual who holds those views. There is a need for persons to serve as the organizational conscience. (5) Allow subordinates to participate in the decision-making process when time permits. (6) Change a bad decision when evidence supports that need for change. (7) Support decisions made by subordinate leaders. (8) Develop an empathy for the values and problems of others in the organization. (9) Teach organizational values and verbalize ethical standards at every opportunity. (10) Subordinate personal and even organizational need to the needs of the society we serve.

ENCOURAGE AND REWARD HONEST COMMUNICATION. All leaders need honest, accurate, and timely information in order to make appropriate decisions. Frequently leaders view that required information as data; the cold, impersonal, empirical facts of the situation. Just as important to the leader is the communication of the feelings and attitudes of the members of the organization toward the action, mission, or decision being made. This is not to say that a popularity poll needs to be taken when decisions are made; rather, the need is for leaders to seek the opinions of subordinates as they pertain to the decision or policy being made. This allows the

leader an opportunity to change or make appropriate adjustments to the decision or to explain to subordinates the reasons for or circumstances that require the decision or policy. Just as the urgency of a situation may overshadow the ethical implication of the intended solution in the leader's decision-making process, so too exists the possibility that subordinates may focus on the ethical implications of the solution without fully understanding the situation that demands the action. An example of this perceptual confusion took place in a training battalion.¹ A trainee abuse charge was brought against a drill sergeant by a soldier in training, a charge which was denied by the drill sergeant. Pending investigation of the charge, the drill sergeant was temporarily assigned to other duties in the company, a normal practice in that brigade. The company commander immediately informed the battalion commander of the situation and he (the battalion commander) contacted the appropriate authorities to initiate a formal investigation. Later in the day the battalion's command sergeant major called the battalion commander from an officers' training class and informed him that the drill sergeant had approached the sergeant major and had admitted the offense with which he had been charged. The battalion commander called in the drill sergeant, advised him of his rights, heard the confession, immediately relieved him from all duties in the company and ordered him to be assigned to duties in the battalion headquarters pending final disposition of the case. Not long afterward the company commander requested permission to talk to the battalion commander. During the conversation that followed, it quickly became apparent that the company commander was concerned that the drill sergeant had been relieved from duty

without cause and without prior consultation with the company commander. He reported that there was considerable unhappiness among the drill sergeants that one of their peers had been relieved from duty based on a statement from a soldier in training, the truth of which had been denied by the drill sergeant. The company commander held that such relief from duty based on an unsubstantiated charge was unethical. The battalion commander thanked the company commander for his concern and then explained that the drill sergeant had admitted the offense, that the swift action was necessary in view of the confirmation of the charge and that the action was in keeping with long-standing standard operating procedures. The battalion commander also acknowledged that a more appropriate action would have been to inform the company commander of the admission of guilt and allow him to take the actions taken by the battalion commander. The battalion commander further explained that this seemingly more appropriate action had not been taken because the battalion commander decided that the greater need for the company commander's presence was at the training sight and not back in the battalion headquarters tending to relief action. Once the company commander had all the information, he no longer had ethical objections to the action. The battalion commander learned the value of sharing information with subordinates immediately and decided that in future cases of this nature, a relief need not be so swift if that swiftness required by-passing the normal command channels. Perhaps the most important aspects of this situation were the belief of the company commander that he could speak to the battalion commander of his ethical concerns without fear of having his career ruined, the willingness of the battalion commander to explain his actions and the

reasoning that led up to them, and the learning that took place for both the company and battalion commanders. A potentially disastrous situation actually resulted in a strengthening of command and personal relationships in that battalion.

VIEW NEGATIVE FEEDBACK AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR LEARNING. This certainly took place in the situation described above. The company commander learned the reasoning process used by his commander, and the battalion commander learned a better way to deal with a difficult decision requirement. Most negative feedback can be used in an organizationally and personally positive way if the leader is secure enough in his self-concept, his position, and his ability to objectively assess the merits of the feedback. He can learn from the truths and instruct the originator of the feedback in areas of misperception or inaccuracy. This allows for learning by both parties and builds a mutual sense of trust and confidence between leader and subordinate.

Consistency in the acceptance of feedback is an important facet of the learning process. Learning takes place by someone each time a message is communicated, even if that learning is a confirmation or validation of earlier learning. Leaders can reverse months or years of reinforcing the concept of learning from feedback simply by ignoring an opportunity for learning from a single message. The non-verbal message communicated to the subordinate can stop the flow of feedback, or at least cause the subordinate to hesitate before delivering the message. The leader who is inconsistent in his handling of feedback can seriously impair the communications network in his organization.

INVESTIGATE THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLICIES, REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES. Leaders are charged with the responsibility for meeting organizational needs. This mission orientation requires that each leader establish and maintain a set of rules or procedures that facilitate or result in the accomplishment of organizational goals. Leaders have also been charged with looking out for the welfare of their subordinates. There exists a danger that, in the urgency of the moment, leaders can focus on organizational goal attainment and limit their concerns for their subordinates to meeting what Maslow would call their safety needs - food, clothing, housing and other requirements for sustaining life. The reality is that there is a mental component to subordinate welfare. When subordinates are placed in situations that contain one or more ethical dilemmas, the expected result can be an increase in individual stress and anxiety as well as a decrease in organizational efficiency. A leader should determine exactly what demands are being placed on his subordinates through the regulations, policies, and directives he intends to use in the accomplishment of organizational goals and then assess the ethical implications of those demands. If a leader finds that rules, regulations or policies are likely to create an ethical dilemma for subordinates, it is his responsibility to devise a different way of accomplishing the goal or change the necessary policies, regulations or directives to eliminate the dilemma. If this cannot be done for some reason, then goal modification may be the appropriate leader action. The divisional reenlistment policy case study presented in Chapter 2 is an illustration of the ethical problems that can be generated when leaders do not fully investigate the ethical implications of their policies in terms of demands for behavior by their subordinates.

Requiring a division to maintain a ninety percent availability rate among a fleet of aging combat vehicles may at first glance appear to meet the organizational mission of instant combat readiness. If repair parts are slow in coming, if support maintenance facilities are inadequate to meet demand or if units are experiencing shortages among maintenance and crew personnel, then this availability rate policy may place unethical demands on subordinates. These demands could result in reduced field training, a situation in which crew proficiency decays rapidly and decreases unit effectiveness. Other possible results include the potential for false readiness reporting and the prostitution of the repair parts system that could include theft of parts from other units. Not one of these possible results could be viewed as promoting organizational goal attainment. It would seem that the focus of the leader must be larger than just organizational goal attainment; the ethicality of goal attainment means must also be assessed. Feedback from subordinates is the essence of ethical investigation.

TOLERATE HONEST DISSENT. Toleration of dissent requires the withholding of sanctions against those who express opinions that differ from those of the leader, much in the same way that honest feedback must be handled if the organization is to thrive. Dissent goes further than feedback in that dissent is almost always a negative reflection of subordinate perceptions of leader or organizational actions, policies, or decisions. Dissent may indicate a belief among subordinates that actions, policies or orders are dysfunctional to the organization or themselves. Dissention may also indicate a lack of agreement among organizational members over what constitutes appropriate courses of action, policies or orders.

Dissent can disrupt organizational goal attainment in several ways. First of all, it can help destroy the mutual trust and confidence between leaders and subordinates if the dissent is viewed by the leaders as personal attacks against them. Secondly, dissent can lessen group cohesion. Thirdly, time spent in dissent can delay the implementation of necessary actions. Dissent can also facilitate organizational goal attainment by exposing possible outcomes of unwise decisions that perhaps the leader had not considered. Constructive dissent can also identify other, more appropriate actions that could better accomplish organizational goals. Dissent can communicate the strength of subordinate feelings and attitudes towards a given action, policy or order. The factor that determines whether dissent will be functional or dysfunctional to organizational goal attainment is how the leader reacts to it.

If the leader is to use dissent constructively, it is necessary for him to determine the reasons for dissent. Ethical reasons are often the result of oversights in the decision-making process and should be acted upon to eliminate the ethical dilemma. Differences of opinion over the most appropriate path to organizational goal attainment can be resolved in any number of ways; the important element is that the leader makes a decision after he has heard all the reasons for dissent. On occasion it may be necessary to acknowledge differences of opinion and not change or modify leader decisions. The leader in the organization has the ultimate responsibility for the actions of the organization and their consequences to society, organizational members, and the organizational structure.

Subordinates have the responsibility of voicing objections and reasons for those objections when they perceive that leader or organizational actions will not serve well the society, the organization, or the people in the organization.

During the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Patton, Air Marshal Tedder and many staff officers met on the morning of December 19, 1944 in Verdun to develop a plan for relieving the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne and to stop the German offensive in the Ardennes. Patton was tasked to accomplish this task and was asked when he could begin the attack. Although Patton was being asked to change his direction of attack by ninety degrees and to move over poor roads for a distance of seventy-five miles, he responded that he could begin in forty-eight hours. Many of those present insisted that Patton could not do the task in that time; they believed that twice that time was really an optimistic estimate and that General Patton was boasting. Patton dissented, insisting that he and his units could do the job in the time specified. After the reasons for the opinions of both Patton and the other officers were heard, plans were formulated based on General Patton's estimates.² Patton had dissented with the opinion of the majority and Generals Eisenhower and Bradley, after hearing both arguments, made a decision supporting the dissenting opinion. History indicates that the decision was a good one and suggest that dissent can be useful in the accomplishment of organizational tasks. Dissent will be investigated more thoroughly in Chapter 4.

ALLOW SUBORDINATES TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISIONMAKING. In most situations, time will permit leaders to involve subordinates in the organizational decision-making process. This technique, often referred to as the Task-Approach Management Model, has been used successfully to develop among subordinates a sense of ownership in the decisions of the organization.³ The theory suggests that subordinates work harder to accomplish tasks and reach goals that they have had a part in establishing. The ethical implications of encouraging subordinate participation in decision-making are that subordinates have an opportunity to assess the implications of projected tasks on their existing resources and share that assessment with the leader. They gain experience in the decision-making process. The opportunity also exists for a better assessment of the ethical implications of the proposed action on the organization, its members and the society it serves. One person making the decision alone could overlook some important implication; the probability of that happening decreases significantly when additional people are allowed to participate in decision-making.

When the M-1 tank was introduced to the Army's equipment inventory, a tank crewman training program had to be developed to train soldiers to use the equipment. Maintenance and turret training plans had to be drastically revised from those used to train crewmen for the older series tanks. The initial belief of the commanders responsible for developing the new training program was that the actual gunnery program for the M-1 tank crewmen should be the same as for the older series tank crewmen. That gunnery program, which progressed from sub-caliber firing through stationary tank-fixed

target to moving tank-fixed and moving target had served tankers well since shortly after World War II. As the final training program was about to be approved, a sergeant in the training and operations section suggested that perhaps the organization was making poor use of the technology available to it. He proposed that when the soldiers fired their first main gun rounds from the tank, they should be fired from a moving tank, preferably at a moving target. He stated that since the advanced technology of the fire control system would allow it, to do less would be to do a disservice to the soldiers being trained. After some initial reluctance on the part of the organizational leadership, the proposal was approved and tested with soldiers of the first group to undergo M-1 training. Target hit rates exceeded ninety percent, a rate far exceeding the hit rates for soldiers undergoing training in the older series tanks using conventional gunnery tables.

What is the ethical implication of this? Perhaps an argument could be made to support the hypothesis that this particular example did not involve ethics but rather was just an example of good leadership and sound decision-making. For the change in gunnery training to take place, several things had to occur. The leaders had to establish and maintain an environment in which subordinates felt free to make observations and suggestions freely. Subordinates had to feel that they were, in fact, being paid to think. Subordinate input to decision-making had not only to be tolerated but solicited. Subordinates also had to be rewarded for innovative thinking. In this case the sergeant received full credit for the innovation. The consequence of all this was that M-1 tank crewman received

the best training that the advanced technology of the tank system would allow, enabling those crewmen to function more efficiently in their units and to be more effective, sooner, in case they were called upon to perform their duties in combat. To have denied these soldiers the better training would have been unethical. To have prevented the environment that allowed for innovation must therefore also be unethical. The essence of ethics in organizational leadership is not just in the behavior of the leader or the short-term consequence of a specific action; rather, it also includes the ethical implications of secondary or even tertiary consequences of an action. These consequences are not always readily apparent but must be consciously sought. Feedback provides the answers.

CHANGE A BAD DECISION WHEN EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT NEED FOR CHANGE. This is such a basic rule for leaders that it almost seems inappropriate to mention it here. We all like to think that when new evidence suggests that a poor decision has been made, we will change the decision. New evidence is transmitted through the feedback process, either from our personal investigations or from those of our subordinates. The unfortunate truth is that leaders can get so personally caught up in the ownership of a decision, concept or action that any negative feedback can be taken as a personal attack and dismissed without action. On occasion a leader with self-concept problems may refuse to change decision because his fears that changing a decision will be viewed by subordinates as a weakness or character flaw.

A lot has been written about self-concept and its effects on leader actions. Generally, leaders with high self-concept are open and accepting

of new ideas and tend to be flexible in their methods for attaining organization's objectives. Leaders with low self-concept may try to mask that feeling, even from themselves, by being very decisive in everything they do, by relying on their own expertise, and by being unreceptive to feedback. Sometimes leaders who are masking low self-concept can accomplish seemingly impossible tasks. Frequently, however, these tasks are accomplished at the expense of their subordinates' ability to operate efficiently over extended periods.⁴ When leaders with low self-concept leave a unit, they frequently leave behind tired subordinates and confused communications systems. A classic example of a leader masking low self-concept is Adolph Hitler. The inflexibility he displayed eventually proved to be very costly when measured against the attainment of national objectives, in spite of his early successes.

SUPPORT DECISIONS MADE BY SUBORDINATES. A primary task of all leaders at every level is to teach subordinates and prepare them for greater leadership responsibilities. Part of the training process is the teaching of subordinates to make appropriate decisions, especially in the absence of senior leaders. Subordinates who know that they are expected to act in the absence of instructions and who feel comfortable in making decisions required by the urgency of the situation can be relied upon to risk making necessary decisions in times of great stress. Leaders who do not support the decisions of subordinates communicate the negative feedback to those subordinates that they are not allowed or expected to make decisions, a situation that seriously detracts from subordinate development.

Should all subordinate decisions be supported? Perhaps an absolute rule is not possible in this instance. Certainly those decisions that have life-threatening implications need to be subjected to review and change. Generally, however, decisions made by subordinates that fall short of the expectations of the leader provide that leader with an excellent teaching vehicle for the subordinate. A critique of a poor decision and a discussion of alternatives in an atmosphere that allows for an exchange of leader-subordinate rationale can have a very positive influence on the ability of a subordinate to make appropriate decisions in future situations. In critiquing a departing battalion commander, a brigade commander once commented to the effect that he always knew that the battalion was in good shape because the battalion commander's subordinates developed so well.⁵ A large part of that development came from the practice of subordinate decision-making.

DEVELOP AN EMPATHY FOR THE VALUES AND PROBLEMS OF OTHERS IN THE ORGANIZATION. Leaders who understand the values of their subordinates and who develop an appreciation for the problems they face find communication with those subordinates easier and more meaningful. The same is true in relationships with peers and seniors. To gain an empathy for the values and problems of others, leaders need to become personally and professionally involved with those persons in the organization whom with they interact. Empathetic understanding of the values and problems of other does not require a leader to subordinate the needs of the organization for the needs of the individual or to accept excuses for an inability to perform a task; rather, it allows the leader to accomplish organizational tasks more

effectively by matching the interests of the individual with the needs of the organization whenever possible and by compensating for problems being experienced by the individual. If, for example, a subordinate leader was seriously short of a particular resource, a leader who knew of the problem could allocate additional resources prior to assigning additional tasks or could assign the task to another subordinate leader who had the resources with which to accomplish the task.

The empathetic understanding of the problems of others does much to foster team spirit or cohesion in the organization. The absence of this empathy has the opposite effect. Not long ago in an Army service school, a new leader received a memorandum from a subordinate leader stating several problems, largely resource-related, that precluded him from accomplishing a task within a specified time. The subordinate asked for either additional resources or some guidance from the new leader concerning which current tasks should be stopped in order that the new one could be started. The new leader forwarded the memo to his superior, along with a comment that the superior should note the type of complainers he had inherited as a part of the organization. Whether the story as related here is accurate or not is immaterial. The fact is that it was circulated rapidly throughout the organization and quickly shut off organizational feedback with any form of negative connotation. Was this action of the new leader poor leadership? That is possible. Was it dysfunctional to the organization? Probably it was. Did it cut off feedback? It definitely did. Was it unethical? I would maintain that the action of the new leader was unethical, and it was unethical for several reasons and at different organizational levels.

Attaching a critical comment to the subordinate leader's memo was unethical in that it unnecessarily attacked the professional reputation of a junior leader whose job it was to inform his leader of problems he was encountering in performing a given task. On a different level, the new leader's action stopped or greatly inhibited the flow of other feedback essential to the efficient functioning of the organization. On still another level, nothing was done to resolve the dilemma of the junior leader who had insufficient resources to accomplish all of his assigned tasks. Further, the non-verbal message to the entire organization was that they were all expected to perform all tasks with no regard for the ability of the individuals to accomplish them. This encouraged subordinates to falsify records or to lie in other ways to indicate that they had accomplished all tasks, even when they did not have the resources to do so. Failure to accomplish all tasks would result in further incidents of character defamation. All of these are reasons for labeling the new leader's actions unethical; all are dysfunctional to the effectiveness of the organization.

Individual values shape individual behaviors. Leaders can anticipate behaviors if they understand the values of those around them. One of the great scenes from the movie "Patton" showed Patton, after defeating Rommel's forces, shouting, "Rommel, you S.O.B, I read your book!" An understanding of the values of his opponent allowed Patton to predict the actions of the units under Rommel's command and contributed to the defeat of those forces. Leaders are not concerned with defeating those with whom they work. They are, however, interested in predicting how they will behave, particularly under stressful conditions. An understanding of the values of those individuals affords the leader an opportunity to capitalize on those values

that are conducive to accomplishing organizational tasks and to shape or change those that are detrimental to mission accomplishment. In an ethics handout used at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, there is quoted a slogan reportedly found in Viet Nam prominently displayed in a Ranger company area.⁶ It read: "Those who kill for fun are sadists, those kill for money are mercenaries. Those who kill for both are Rangers."⁶ I can not help wondering how many atrocities resulted from this "funny" slogan. I am also concerned for the moral responsibility of the leaders who allowed the slogan to remain for any atrocities committed by members of the unit. If the slogan accurately reflected individual or collective values, the actions of that organization were predictable.

TEACH ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES AND VERBALIZE ETHICAL STANDARDS. It is necessary for leaders to teach and reinforce values that facilitate those behaviors required to accomplish organizational goals. The feedback from teaching is the measurable behavior of the individuals and the organization. The case of the American prisoners of war in Hanoi during the Viet Nam war is an excellent example of teaching values and verbalizing standards. For years those who served in the armed forces of the United States had been taught the Code of Conduct for behavior in combat and after capture. While few could quote the code in its entirety, nearly all understood the philosophy or spirit in which it was written. Those who drafted the code assumed that any hostile force encountered would adhere to the rules governing behavior towards prisoners of war as specified by the Geneva Convention. Very quickly American prisoners found that specific requirements of the Code of Conduct were impossible to maintain under heavy torture. Using the Code as a guide, prisoners were instructed by their

senior officers to comply as closely as possible to that code without being killed. They recognized that any prisoner's will could be broken; they demanded that the enemy pay a moral price for any admission and that prisoners resist to the best of their abilities. With very few exceptions, the Americans were successful in implementing those standards. While many or all were broken repeatedly, they were never broken easily. The determination and will of each of those prisoners were constantly reinforced by their fellow prisoners with clandestine communications and personal contact when possible. The feedback from the teaching of organizational values and ethical standards to those American servicemen in a stressful situation that defies description was conduct worthy of emulation by everyone; conduct that was one of the bright spots in an otherwise bleak war.

In every organizational leadership situation opportunities exist to reinforce organizational values and ethical standards. The teaching and reinforcement of these values and standards can have a major impact on leader - subordinate perceptions. It can be argued that no human behavior, in itself, is wrong. Following that same line of thought, then no behavior by itself can create problems in the organization. Problems are generated only when the expectations of the subordinate, based on his understanding of values and standards, are not highly correlated to the expectations of the leader. In an ethical questionnaire recently given to a number of officers at the Command and General Staff College, respondents were asked to determine the ethicality of the behavior of the participants in a situation where a combat leader told a subordinate to "take care of these...

prisoners (derogatory terms omitted) and later discovered that the subordinate had executed the prisoners. The problem in this situation came about as a result of a misperception by the subordinate of the leader's directive to "take care" of the prisoners. The leader's expectation was that the prisoners would be evacuated; the subordinate's expectation was that he should kill the "... prisoners." The leader's responsibility was to clearly teach and outline the organizational values and ethical standards pertaining to the treatment of prisoners. The subordinate then would probably not have executed the prisoners.

In evaluating feedback in the form of performance, it is important that the leader determine the reason for unacceptable performance, in this case the execution of prisoners. If the leader does not recognize his own culpability (in this case not having issued clear guidance and not having reinforced organizational values and ethical standards) and take appropriate steps to correct it; the probability exists that under similar circumstances the same behavior would recur.

SUBORDINATE PERSONAL AND EVEN ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS TO THE NEEDS OF THE SOCIETY. Selfless service is a great facilitator of communications and feedback. Subordinates communicate freely with leaders who are perceived to be looking out for the welfare of the members of the organization and who are seen as trying to do the right thing for the country. Seniors also tend to be receptive to feedback when they perceive those same qualities in the behavior of subordinate leaders. Communications are not facilitated when subordinates perceive leaders to be looking out for themselves or trying to further their careers at the expense of subordinates, the organization, or

the society. The leader need not actually be self-serving; he need only to be perceived to be self-serving to hinder organizational communication and feedback. Frequently those leaders described as "Type A", those who must stay constantly busy and demand similar behavior and instant results from subordinates, are perceived to be self-serving. The leaders in this category often justify their actions by insisting that they are necessary to accomplish organizational goals, goals they frequently set themselves.

When soldiers enlist, they swear (or affirm) to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, to bear true faith and allegiance to that Constitution, and to obey the orders of the officers appointed over them. In effect they are promising loyalty to their officers and to their country, with their country having priority. There is no reference to the organization in the oath of enlistment. If the soldier's responsibility is to his officers and his country, the leader's primary responsibilities should be to the country and to his subordinates. Organizational needs, goals, and demands are valid only if they serve to facilitate the accomplishment of national objectives and the well-being of those who serve organizational leaders.

The organizational requirements for accurate and timely communications remain constant at all levels. Verbal and non-verbal communications influence every facet of organizational life. Communications, especially disclosure and feedback, also play an important part in individual growth and development. The Johari window is a good method for illustrating this point. Every individual has a part of himself that is known to both himself and others. This is the public self. There is another facet of the

individual, known to himself and not to others, that may be called the private self. Yet a third aspect of an individual is that which is known by others but not known by the individual, the blind self. The fourth part of the individual consists of that which is unknown to both the self and others, the unknown.

| | KNOWN TO SELF | UNKNOWN TO SELF |
|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Known to others | Public | Blind |
| Unknown to others | Private | Unknown |

Figure 8. Johari Window

When feedback is added to the Johari window, it moves the vertical line between the known and unknown aspects of the self to the right, reducing the blind area. The individual learns more about himself from the feedback received from others. He has not learned new behavior; he has learned something about his existing behavior. An example of this could be a person bring told that he or she snores when asleep. Figure 9 illustrates this change caused by feedback.




Figure 9. Effect of Feedback

Personal disclosure reduces the size of the private self and allows more feedback to take place. This requires that leaders be willing to share data about themselves in the organizational setting.⁷ Hersey and Blanchard say that the most important disclosure is not verbal; rather, it is behavior, or non-verbal communication. They also maintain that disclosure is only appropriate when it is organizationally relevant. Figure 10 shows the effect of disclosure on the private and unknown self.




Figure 10. Effect of Disclosure and Feedback

The shaded area in figure 10 represents the amount of personal growth that results from the disclosure - feedback process. This concept suggests that personal effectiveness increases as the size of the unknown facet of the individual decreases. Probably no one ever learns everything there is to know about the self, but leaders who risk making organizationally relevant disclosures in the organizational setting and are receptive to feedback tend to have strong self-concepts and are more likely to develop high-performance teams than those who are unwilling to risk personal disclosure or feedback.⁸

Communication is the framework upon which organizations function. The leader's influence on the ability and willingness of subordinates to establish and maintain effective two-way communications networks is

absolute. Whether this influence is positive or negative is dependant to a significant degree on the self-concept of the leader, his willingness to grow both personally and organizationally, and his ability to relate on a personal basis with those with whom he works. How the leader uses the communications network in the organization determines to a great extent the command climate of that organization.

CHAPTER 4

COMMAND CLIMATE

It is impossible to discuss ethics in organizational leadership without addressing command climate. For the purposes of this paper, command climate may be defined as the atmosphere, developed and maintained by the leader, in which the business of the organization is conducted. That command climate can be positive (subordinates are free to make decisions and possess appropriate responsibilities and authority) or it can be negative (subordinates have little authority and considerable responsibility, with decision-making accomplished at the top of the organizational pyramid). Organizations with positive command climates generally are characterized by the commanders' trust in their subordinates to do the best job possible in the execution of their duties, decentralized decision-making, organizational consistency between that which is espoused and that which is practiced, simplicity in systems functioning, and a viable program for stress management. Organizations with negative command climates tend to be characterized by centralized decision-making (implying a lack of trust in subordinates), an inadequate system for priority-setting, an attitude of intolerance for honest mistakes ("zero defects"), poor communications between leaders and subordinates, and inadequate resourcing for organizational missions. The command climate can vary according to the level of the organization being examined. For instance, a division or corps commander may create an atmosphere which facilitates a positive command climate by empowering subordinates with decision-making authority and by minimizing controls on subordinates from the higher echelons in the organization. At the battalion level, however, a commander might

consolidate decision-making authority at his level while giving responsibilities to subordinates, thus creating a negative battalion command climate in a division or corps that otherwise enjoys a positive command climate. Those persons in an organization called upon to actually accomplish the work required to achieve organizational goals will view the command climate as being negative if a leader at any level blocks the efforts of senior leaders to establish and maintain a positive climate. The key to positive command climate appears to be decentralized authority and responsibility in an organization in which all leaders safeguard that decentralization through their personal authority and the clearly defined regulations, directives and other rules that govern their organizations.

The argument has been made that positive command climate is not an ethical issue; rather, it is a sound leadership practice. This argument has merit only if first-order consequences are investigated. The implications of command climate, both positive and negative, at various organizational levels on the ethical behavior of leaders and subordinates are many. Where the command climate is negative (centralized decision-making, subordinate authority inconsistent with responsibilities), innovation among subordinates is the first casualty. As stress increases, people tend to become conservative. They revert to actions that have served them well in the past. This very principle is the basis for battle drills used to train people to respond in a given way when they encounter a similar situation under the stress of combat. While this Pavlovian stimulus-response or classical conditioning model is functional to the organization conducting tactical field maneuvers in or out of combat, it is dysfunctional to the organization that needs innovative thinking to keep pace with advancing technologies.

The second casualty in an organization with a negative command climate is the ethical standard for behavior. When leaders make decisions at the highest level possible, when savings bond participation rate statistics receive the same command attention as combat vehicle availability, and when there is never enough time for leader training, then the prostitution of ethical standards for conduct generally is close at hand. Leaders and subordinates only have a given amount of time and energy to accomplish tasks. When time and energy are squandered in the accomplishment of meaningless or unimportant tasks and when career advancement is contingent upon successful accomplishment of both organizationally important and unimportant tasks, then reports often are falsified, statistics are manipulated, and authority for decision making is consolidated at the highest level in the organization. Leaders become afraid to take risks by allowing subordinates to use initiative. Leaders and subordinates become more interested in doing or reporting to have done that which is necessary for personal survival in the organization than in doing what is necessary for the organization to serve the society.

After, or perhaps as the result of, the decline in innovation and ethical standards, organizations with negative command climates generally experience a lessening in long term effectiveness. Time spent in the accomplishment of non-essential tasks can result ultimately in the neglect of mission-essential tasks. Falsified reports and manipulated statistics can lull leaders into a false sense of security, a condition easily shattered when the organization is called upon to perform its primary function in combat. Subordinates who have not enjoyed the authority appropriate for their responsibilities become unable to exercise

decision-making powers in combat when there is no authority figure around to make the required decisions for them. This atrophy in the ability to engage in innovative thinking generates a lag between technological advances and utilization procedures, a situation that can result in the inefficient use of resources. Leader attention is spent in dealing with crises; long-term planning suffers. Leaders and subordinates can eventually become completely occupied in keeping the organizational ship afloat, with no time or energy left to direct that ship towards a meaningful goal. Instead, staying afloat becomes the organizational goal.

When an organization becomes stagnant or when all the energy of its members is spent in managing crises, careerism has an opportunity to emerge as the dominant personal motivation for individual behavior. The rationalization process in this situation suggests that the organization is about to fall anyway, so the prudent thing to do is to insure that no blame for that fall can be affixed to the individual. This leads to a significant amount of time and energy being expended in actions designed to protect a personal reputation rather than in keeping the organization going or moving it toward the accomplishment of its primary goals. Those individuals who have repressed careerist impulses might then exploit the situation of organizational confusion and embark on a program designed to advance their careers, even at the expense of the organization. This is a form of organizational pillaging; the use of the organization for personal gain with little or no consideration given to furthering the organization's abilities to meet the needs of the society it serves.

Perhaps one of the most organizationally destructive consequence of a negative command climate can be found in the attitudes of the subordinates.

Negative command climate generates frustration, anxiety and stress among those who labor to accomplish organizational goals. Shifting unit priorities, exploitation by self-serving careerist leaders and an inability to develop professionally all contribute to a cynicism that promotes a work ethic of "just getting by." Those situations of negative command climate also contribute in an unmeasurable way to personnel turbulence by diminishing soldier commitment to the organization and the nation. Soldiers who are not committed to the unit and to the Army are much more likely to be discharged before the end of their enlistment contracts. They are also much less likely to reenlist. The resultant turbulence among the organization's personnel detracts from team cohesion and inhibits other team-building initiatives.¹ Uncommitted personnel and groups with little cohesion among their members seldom contribute to or develop into high-performance organizations.

What does a positive command climate contribute to the organization? The effects of a positive command climate vary according to a number of factors. Generally, however, positive command climate allows units to maintain a standard of high performance as opposed to requiring units to peak for special occasions or missions. Positive command climate fosters the development of initiative among subordinates and prepares leaders to assume more responsible leadership positions in the organization by empowering them with authority commensurate with their responsibilities. They are encouraged to make decisions, thereby gaining the experience required to make important decisions in critical situations and in the absence of higher authority. Subordinates are free to try innovative approaches to problem-solving and leaders are presented with multiple alternatives in their decision-making process.

Positive command climate allows leaders to do that which is ethical by focusing on the needs and missions of the organization and eliminating or reducing the need to be concerned about surviving professionally in a given situation. A positive command climate is one in which the leadership is open to feedback and interested in solving ethical dilemmas as they develop. This requires that leaders be willing to accept diminished immediate efficiency in order to promote long-term effectiveness.

The ability of leaders to act ethically requires two conditions: a willingness to take risks and a trust in their seniors, peers and subordinates. Without these conditions the leader can not be free to follow the dictates of his conscience nor will he be willing to allow his subordinates to follow theirs. Risking often means standing up for what the individual considers to be right/moral/ethical, even if there is some danger that such a stance may result in some personal repercussion. Risking may also involve allowing subordinates to try even though they might fail in order that they can gain the experience they need to be effective in stressful situations later. Trust in those with whom the individual works includes reinforcing a belief that actions taken by members of the organization are well-intentioned attempts to accomplish organizational tasks or to improve organizational functioning. While failure is not encouraged, when it does occur, the individual needs to know that it will be used as a learning vehicle to assure success in future actions and will not be used to penalize the individual.

How is a positive command climate established and maintained? An experiment in implementing human and leadership goals is presently being conducted at Fort Hood, Texas. The vehicle for this test is the development

and maintenance of a positive command climate at all levels in the organization. The leaders are interested in providing the type of organizational climate that will allow them to capitalize on the skill, training and initiative of each member of the organization.

The commander believes that the major challenge facing leaders at all levels is to use the energy of all members of the organization wisely.² He has recognized that in every organization there is only a given amount of energy that can be expended in accomplishing a task. This corporate energy is the sum of the available energy of the individuals with which the organization is constituted. The commander recognizes that there is a limit to what a leader can expect people and an organization to do. His belief is that if a leader expends a significant amount of energy preparing defenses against inspections from higher headquarters and establishing "a statistical fortress" in defense of his actions, he will have minimal energy left with which to coach subordinates, he will not be innovative in his approach to task accomplishment, and he may not be able to actually accomplish his organizational objectives. The Fort Hood commander is interested in providing guidance and quality assurance in his organization by means of sampling techniques that do not divert the energy of leaders or subordinates from the accomplishment of primary organizational tasks.

The Fort Hood commander believes that the key components for building a positive command climate include command trust, organizational consistency in policy and actions, simplicity in organizational functioning, and stress management. Each of these components is vital if a positive command climate is to be established and maintained.

Trust may be defined as assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone. Command trust, therefore, implies faith and confidence in leaders, peers, and subordinates. An example of command trust could be allowing a subordinate leader to decide whether an ambulance and medical personnel are necessary on a firing range, based on the leader's assessment of the danger of the activity being conducted, the probability of an injury occurring, and the availability of help should the need arise. Command trust is not the publication of a regulation requiring the presence of an ambulance and medical personnel at all firing range and field training sites. In a basic training environment, command trust includes allowing drill sergeants and company commanders to nominate maladaptive soldiers for discharge under provisions of the Trainee Discharge Program and allowing battalion commanders to determine whether all reasonable attempts have been made to help those maladaptive soldiers adjust to Army life and then recommend discharge or retention. Seniors need to trust subordinates to make their best judgments. Subordinates likewise need to trust their leaders to exercise their best judgment, and neither should be threatened by the actions of the other. Actions taken in good faith should not be perceived to be a threat to anyone if command trust is operative.

Organizational consistency between policy and action is the second of the key components for a positive command climate. Leaders send many verbal and nonverbal messages daily to seniors, peers, and subordinates. If these messages conflict with each other or with established organizational priorities, confusion, frustration, induced stress and organizational chaos can result. At Fort Hood, leaders have used the measurement of things as an example of organizational consistency. They are very aware of the actions

and reactions that occur when senior leaders attempt to measure things. Much energy is spent by subordinates in measuring those things the leaders measure to insure that they, the subordinates and their organization, are not caught short or are not surprised by the results of the measurement. Since the commander at Fort Hood has stated that the three priorities for his organization are training, maintenance and leadership, he demonstrates organizational consistency by measuring only those endeavors that have been identified as priorities. Only the data generated from measurements taken of those priority functions are allowed to proceed through the leadership chain; all other performance feedback, however acquired, goes only to the leader of the unit that generated the performance data. Another example of organizational consistency at Fort Hood is the development of responsibility among subordinates. The line of reasoning is that in time of war junior non-commissioned officers are entrusted with the lives of men; therefore, in peacetime those same individuals should be given the same or very similar responsibilities. The concept is to practice in peace that which leaders expect in war. The expectation is that in time of war those leaders who are accustomed to great responsibility and who have exercised the authority commensurate with that responsibility will perform more capably than those who have never been so entrusted.

Simplicity in organizational functioning, the third of the key components for a positive command climate, demands that unresponsive, unnecessary bureaucratic organizations that absorb energy needed in accomplishing announced organizational mission priorities should be simplified or eliminated. At Fort Hood, the simplification process began with a review of local regulations to change those that were either

unnecessary or that were inconsistent with command philosophy and priorities. A review of 388 local regulations led to the elimination of 88 and a revision of an additional 238. In all, a total of one thousand pages of regulations were eliminated, certainly a positive step towards reducing unnecessary bureaucracy. A review of the number and frequency of routine meetings revealed that senior leaders spent an inordinate amount of time in meetings that were not needed. A review of records and reports required from leaders suggested that many were unnecessary. These unnecessary reports diverted leader time and energy that could have been better expended in the accomplishment of organizational goals. Similarly, the number of statistics kept was greatly reduced to conserve time and energy at every level in the organization. Command inspection procedures were reviewed and those that were found to be dysfunctional or inconsistent with command philosophy and priorities were eliminated. Those inspections that were retained were oriented to the discovery of systemic problems and teaching leaders how to solve those problems. Necessary procedures, such as those required for the issue and turn-in of ammunition and the turn-in of equipment for repair, were rewritten to facilitate easy accomplishment of the task. Useless requirements, such as a fire evacuation diagram in a room with one door near a main exit, were eliminated. Feedback mechanisms to measure how well the organization was doing in building a positive command climate were designed to be quick and simple. An inspected leader got a chance to comment on the quality of the inspection; short, mailable surveys were used to provide immediate feedback to senior leaders on selected issues; and a special telephone number to handle suggestions for fixing systemic problems was established.

There are undoubtedly other ways to simplify organizational functioning in addition to those used by Fort Hood. The systematic approach used to review all organizational procedures for doing business appears to show great promise in eventually eliminating those distractors that divert the time and energy of leaders and their subordinates from the accomplishment of organization goals.

The last of the key command climate components to be discussed is that of stress management. A number of studies have documented the negative effects of excessive and prolonged stress on the ability of people to function adequately. Excessive stress is not necessarily generated from a single stressful incident; it can result from an accumulation of stress from a series of relatively minor incidents and concerns. In an individual, excessive stress can lead to strange and unethical behavior, physiological maladies, and eventual physical and psychological incapacitation. Innovative behaviors appear to be inversely proportional to the stress under which the individual is operating, at least until the situation appears hopeless. At the point of hopelessness, the individual can become exceptionally innovative. These innovative behaviors are aimed at self-preservation, however, and seldom have any positive organizational value. Frequently they may be dysfunctional to the achievement of organizational goals, as in an instance where a soldier throws down his rifle and runs when subjected to the stress of close combat.

A positive command climate can measurably contribute to the reduction of individual stress by incorporating into organizational procedures methods for reducing dysfunctional stress. Leader actions that reduce confusion and

frustration that result from inconsistencies between stated and perceived goal priorities also reduce individual stress and anxiety. Giving subordinate leaders authority consistent with their responsibilities, adding structure to the work environment to eliminate or reduce uncertainty, and attending to the needs of the families of the organizational members are all actions that result in reduced stress levels in leaders and subordinates. In preparing for the stress of combat, strenuous physical conditioning and tough, realistic training instill in soldiers confidence in themselves and their leadership, which in turn delays the accumulation of dysfunctional levels of stress. Once in combat, Babad and Solomon³ suggest that intervention in a severely stressed organization by trained psychologists significantly reduces the time required to psychologically reconstitute an organization for the continued stress of combat.

Stress management in military organizations seems to require the elimination of the confusion and frustration that result from conflicting priorities and goals, the reduction of uncertainty in the work environment, the reduction of stressors outside of the work environment, rigorous and realistic training to eliminate or reduce the uncertainty of combat, and the use of every means available to facilitate the reduction of stress felt by individuals once the organization has been committed to combat.

A major theme in positive command climate is the empowering of subordinate leaders with the necessary authority to meet their present responsibilities and those projected for the future. Empowering leaders may be defined as the dynamic process of delegating and aligning missions, objectives and priorities with the necessary authority, sense of

responsibility and resources to allow leaders at the lowest possible level to accomplish organizational tasks. Empowering leaders requires that senior leaders take the time to establish and clarify organizational objectives, priorities and standards (both ethical and quality) to the degree necessary for subordinate leaders to understand the requirements as well as the philosophic basis for those requirements. This allows subordinate leaders to fully support organizational objectives, priorities and standards as they lead their units to goal attainment. Understanding the philosophic reasoning behind goal identification allows subordinate leaders to make necessary adjustments and changes required by unforeseen situations encountered during the process leading to organizational goal attainment.

Empowering leaders also requires that senior leaders trust subordinates to do their best to accomplish the organization's goals while meeting ethical and quality standards. To do this all members of the organization must perceive themselves to be working together on the same team to accomplish a common task. Leaders who do not trust subordinates to do their best often oversupervise, a situation that leads to a reduction in innovation, initiative and cohesion among members of the organization. Oversupervision also leads to frustration and increased levels of stress and anxiety among those who perceive themselves to be oversupervised. Leaders must train subordinate leaders in the skills necessary for them to accomplish the mission to the required standards. This includes insisting that basic, important things be done correctly and doing additional training and coaching where feedback from a measuring process indicates a requirement.

To effectively implement an empowering of subordinate leaders, senior leaders require courage, trust, managerial competence, and the willingness to relinquish some of the controls they may have become accustomed to exercising. Once the senior leader has explained organizational goals, priorities and expected standards to subordinate leaders, it is necessary for him to allow those subordinate leaders to devise and initiate their own plans for the accomplishment of those goals. The Fort Hood experience has shown that for this to happen all leaders must receive accurate and timely progress feedback and trust subordinate leaders to make appropriate adjustment or initiate other corrective actions. Senior leaders are most effective when they pass measured data or feedback to subordinate leaders for comparison with organizational standards. This reinforces the subordinates' perceptions that all members of the organization are on the same team, working toward reaching a common objective. For senior leaders to demand specific corrective actions to compensate for the discrepancy between measured data and organizational standards is to insure the reinforcement of a "we-them" philosophy of doing business.

The experience at Fort Hood also suggests that senior leaders should leave much of the measurement function to subordinate leaders for the evaluation of the performance of their own organizations. Senior leaders may best measure results, not by statistical analysis, but through impressions formed from viewing many things. "The gut feeling formed by the assimilation of many observations are often more accurate measurements than any statistic."⁴ Subordinate leaders should be encouraged to establish their own standards of performance and ethical conduct as long as those

standards meet minimum Army and societal standards. Empowering subordinate leaders usually has resulted in increased unit efficiency and productivity and a reduction in unethical conduct.

To encourage and develop subordinate responsibility, Fort Hood stresses that each leader observe these general rules:

1. Spend time clarifying objectives; make it easy for subordinates to ask questions and give feedback.

2. Explain the intent of orders so subordinates can use initiative and independent action to achieve the desired objective.

3. Don't do anything routinely yourself that a subordinate can do almost as well.

4. Provide idea sharing and suggestions but let the subordinate select the technique that fits best.

5. Involve subordinates in decision-making whenever time permits. It usually does.

6. Respect the schedules of subordinates.

7. Be sure that subordinate leaders are the first to know of policy changes and their rationale so that they can respond to soldier's questions with confidence.

8. Remember that "power down" does not mean "turn off the power." It means push enough power downwards so that subordinates can do their jobs.

Closely correlated with empowering subordinate leaders is the concept of the professional development of subordinate leaders. If subordinate leaders are going to be empowered to run their own organizations without the larger organization experiencing a decrease in productivity or efficiency, then

these subordinate leaders must receive training in leadership and management techniques as well as in the technical skills appropriate for their organizations. There is little organizational value in empowering leaders who are unprepared or poorly equipped to handle an increase in responsibilities and authority.

Service schools generally prepare soldiers to perform specific task. No one expects proficiency from service school graduates; rather, they should expect only familiarity with the subject material. Proficiency comes with practice and training once the soldier enters the organization. Similarly, junior leaders are often unprepared to handle great responsibility. That ability is acquired through training received in the organization, coaching from senior leaders, and from experience and practice. The proficiency of subordinate leaders is the responsibility of senior leaders, not the service school system. If subordinate leaders fail in their attempts to efficiently and effectively run their organizations, then part of the responsibility for that failure must be borne by the senior leadership in the organization. Too frequently newly-minted leaders are turned loose in their new organizations and are expected to be effective immediately, without training or experience. If they are not instantaneously successful they are removed from their organizations and discarded as being useless to the organization. The rationale for this action seems to be that the discarded leader must have a character flaw that precludes his or her ability to absorb knowledge and experience through some unspecified process of osmosis. The ethicality of this action is questionable.

Senior leaders who are interested in improving the effectiveness of their organizations by improving the command climates also assume responsibility for the education of their subordinate leaders. The education process includes formal training, an opportunity for practice, and a systematic method for coaching and providing performance counseling. Also necessary for the education of junior leaders is the reinforcement of the authority by senior leaders. This can be accomplished by performing all organizational tasks through the recognized chain of command, without shortcuts. Subordinates at all levels need to receive their instructions from their immediate supervisors, not some leader two or more levels above them in the organizational hierarchy. Operating in the approved leadership channels legitimizes the organizational status of the junior leaders and provides them with the experience necessary to improve their learning processes.

Professional development cannot be limited to just the organization's leaders. At the lowest level in the organization there exists the resource that does the work of that organization. The leaders in the organization of tomorrow begin their developmental process while members of that group. The present chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was once a rifleman in an infantry squad. Leaders at all levels in the organization have a primary responsibility to nurture this resource by providing for individual and family development and to capitalize on the potential of this resource by eliminating individual and family distractors that divert the energy that should be used in the attainment of organizational goals. Leaders can accomplish this by structuring the soldier's environment in a way that

facilitates his being able to devote his undivided attention to his job, provides him a disciplined way of life, presents him with personally challenging tasks, and eliminates organizational nonsense and incongruities that detract from the creditability of the organization. First, soldiers need to be afforded the opportunity to maintain their health and physical fitness; this requires adequate physical facilities in which to live and work. Second, leaders who promote and foster the welfare of the soldiers' families will be rewarded for those efforts with family support for the soldiers' professional duties. Soldiers who perceive that their families are neglected or in need frequently neglect their jobs to provide for their families or they will not reenlist, choosing instead to leave the organization and seek employment where the needs of their families can be met. Additionally a poor home environment adds additional stress to that which a soldier experiences on the job, making him more susceptible to physical or psychological incapacitation. It makes good sense to lower the stress levels of soldiers through an affirmative family action plan whenever the opportunity for such action arises. A part of that family action plan must include coordination with the local communities in which we ask our soldiers and their families to live.

The experiment in improved command climate at Fort Hood has had mixed results. Incoming leaders still try to determine what their senior leaders measure as indicators for doing well. They generally attempt to do well in those areas by working with the existing chain of command and by establishing goals for their organizations that will strengthen the position of their subordinate leaders. Surveys indicate that subordinates perceive a

gradual but steady improvement in those areas that have caused them problems in the past, such as misuse of statistical data, useless reports, and unnecessary meetings. One relatively new brigade commander stated that perhaps the greatest remaining problem is the propensity for leaders to do the jobs of their subordinates, a condition that suggests that those leaders lack the trust in the ability and willingness of their subordinates to accomplish unit tasks, the trust that is required to fully implement the Corps Commander's empowering leaders philosophy.⁵ The brigade commander suggests that perhaps this seeming unwillingness to allow subordinates to do their jobs may be the result of years of leader conditioning in an environment that espoused "zero defects;" it might also be the inevitable result of the careerism that has become so widespread in the last few decades. The III Corps commander and his staff admit that gains made in improving the command climate at Fort Hood are fragile and require constant reinforcement. They also believe that the improvements in organizational functioning and the development of subordinates are worth the efforts required to establish and maintain a positive command climate.

Command climate includes all facets of organizational life. It involves leaders, subordinates, families and society. It requires leaders who trust and take risks, and it requires subordinates who trust and support leaders. Education of leaders and subordinates plays a part, as does the refinement of leadership and management processes. Central to the concept of command climate is the maintenance of high standards for performance and ethical conduct. A positive command climate seems to afford the most likely opportunity for the maintenance of both.

CHAPTER 5

DISSENT

Loyalty and obedience have long been held as fundamental virtues demanded in professional soldiers at all levels in the organization. Custom has demanded loyalty to the unit; the oath of enlistment or oath of commissioning has required loyalty to the nation. Loyalty to the officers and other organizational leaders has generally been looked upon as something to be earned by each individual or at least as a quality that needed to be reinforced by each leader. Enlistment and commissioning oaths require obedience to the orders of leaders senior to the person taking the oath. It seems rather clear that "good" soldiers and "good" leaders have developed in an atmosphere where loyalty to the organization and to those with whom they work is expected, and the absence of that loyalty is viewed as being bad or as being a sort of malignant character flaw that demands the immediate removal of the individual possessing such a flaw from the organization before others can be similarly contaminated.

The loyalty hierarchy seems to be one in which an individual is expected to demonstrate loyalty first to his seniors, then to his subordinates. Once that loyalty has been established, each individual is expected to display loyalty to the organization and then to the nation. The oath we take upon entering the military profession demands loyalty only to the constitution or nation. It then demands obedience to the orders of the officers appointed under provisions of that constitution, orders that are given in pursuit of the maintenance of the constitution against all foreign or domestic enemies. Custom seems to have taken the concept of loyalty to the nation, expanded it

to include the organization in which we serve and the people with whom we serve and then reprioritized the order in which that loyalty is expected to be displayed.

The matter of obedience to orders given by leaders has never been seriously questioned. Military personnel obey orders given by other military personnel more senior to themselves and senior military leaders receive and obey orders from the civilian leaders appointed over them. This method of doing business insures a reasonably efficient, disciplined approach to the task of issuing guidance that ultimately results in the accomplishment of organizational tasks. Any other method, many argue, would result in chaos and unacceptable delay in the accomplishment of mission requirements. This argument may also be a rationalization for our seeming inability to register dissent in matters of ethical or moral concern.

Loyalty and obedience to orders have become such overpowering virtues that dissent has come to be viewed as the antithesis of those virtues. Process dissent is concerned with ways to accomplish a specific task or implement a given policy. Dissent in process matters, discussed in an earlier chapter, can lead to better, more efficient and more ethical task accomplishment. The dissent to be discussed in this chapter is not that which is concerned with differences of opinion in process matters; rather, it deals with differences of opinion in goal and policy identification and implementation. While process dissent has certain threatening overtones for leaders (especially for those leaders who tend to be insecure or who have low self-concept), goal and policy dissent by or among senior leaders has come to be looked upon as a form of treason or extreme personal disloyalty.

This over-reaction to value-laden words and concepts effectively argues that subordinate leaders should assume the ethicality of national strategic and Army goals and concern themselves only with the ethical implications of process matters if they wish to continue to function as leaders in the organization.

If the assumption is that national, strategic, and Army goals are all inherently ethical, then leader concern should be devoted to process matters. The fact is, however, that these goals are established by secular beings, fallable man. The same ethical and moral issues that create dilemmas for subordinate leaders are present and perhaps even magnified at the upper levels of national leadership. If subordinate leaders experience ethical dilemmas in establishing goals and implementing procedures to attain those goals, why should we expect that moral and ethical problems do not exist at the highest level of leadership? Certainly the history of this nation and others around the world have many documented instances of national and strategic policy decisions that have been made for personal interests or in the interest of a specific group at the expense of the nation or several nations. In this country the issues of ending the participation of the United States in the Korean and Vietnam wars became election issues for political candidates. Policies effecting the conduct of these wars became more concerned with facilitating national politics than with pursuing international and military objectives. Instances of national policy-making done to satisfy personal greed and graft requirements are numerous and have resulted in many scandals over the years. To assume, then, that all national, strategic, and Army goal and policies are moral and

ethical seems to be unrealistic. If this assumption is unrealistic (and the assumption in this chapter is that it is), then it is the ethical responsibility of the professional military leadership of this nation to dissent in instances where senior-level policy and goals are perceived to violate moral and ethical standards. That ethical responsibility comes with taking the oath of enlistment or commissioning and contains no caveat for the maintenance of personal career and promotion mobility or progression. The implication of the oaths is that we, the people who take those oaths, "bite the bullet," as it were, and stand up to be counted on moral and ethical issues without rationalizing ourselves into a position of non-action and non-dissent. One can only wonder what would have been the result if the senior national and military leadership in Nazi Germany had dissented against the national policy of ethnic extermination for Jews. Whatever the result, it probably would have resulted in far fewer deaths than the millions that resulted from rationalization and non-action. Moreover, it is in the atmosphere of permissiveness, inaction, and no dissent that immoral and unethical philosophies and issues are spawned and developed. Dissent functions, or should function, as the conscience of the organization and of the society. That function is necessary for the maintenance of a moral, democratic society. Dissent, it may be argued, can be a greater virtue in society than loyalty to the organization and obedience to orders. There are times when the only moral and ethical course of action open to leaders is that of dissent, regardless of the possible personal and organizational consequences of that dissent. Loyalty to the nation or to the organization may require dissent with policies and goals if the individual sees those goals or policies as being immoral or unethical.

Ethical responsibility and ethical behavior are always the responsibility of the individual and not the organization.

. . . In this view, judgment and choice are central to ethics, and no soldier can ever abandon his obligation to act ethically to any other man without ceasing to be ethical himself or, indeed, without . . . [becoming] somewhat less human. An individual is never justified in acquiescing to orders he judges to be immoral, no matter whether they are issued by military or civilian superiors. This is not to say that he may not obey orders of which he is not sure, although he will be held responsible for the consequences. But if a soldier is convinced in his judgment that an order he is being told to execute is immoral, he may not abandon the ethical obligation to resist or refuse these orders in an appropriate manner.

This quote from Gabriel raises several interesting points. The first of these is the concept that the individual is never justified in obeying an order he considers to be immoral. Nothing is said of the rationalizations of long-term benefits to the organization or the greater good or of the ends justifying the means. The implication of the statement is that there can never be justification for obeying immoral orders, not even when personal or professional self-preservation is contingent upon obeying those orders or conforming with immoral policies. To obey immoral orders is to act unethically. This is a position commonly held by ethical absolutists, most notably Kant.²

The second point to be addressed is the issue of determining that which is moral and that which is immoral. How do we determine what is moral or ethical? Chapter one dealt with the ethical continuum for behavior, and the leader's responsibility to move the organizational belt of acceptability for behavior as close as possible to the absolute pole of that continuum. The

standard for determining that which is absolutely moral or ethical is largely based in religion. The absolute standards for moral or ethical behavior consist of the Ten Commandments from the Judeo-Christian tradition and those laws, regulations and other policies that are not in conflict with those Commandments. Whether or not a leader is religious is not an issue. The fact is that the society we serve was founded in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Our pledge of allegiance acknowledges national subserviance to God, our coins proclaim our trust in God, and our ethical code is based on the commandments of God. It is not possible to make a moral determination in our society without that religious reference point. Ethical judgments can be made from circumstantial inputs; however, that which is demanded to insure ethicality in behavior (the ethical imperative) requires that those judgments be universalized into propositions that can serve as standards of judgment for other actions under similar conditions or circumstances.

" . . . an ethical imperative is what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, and acted disinterestedly and benevolently."³ An action, therefore, is ethical in a given situation if it will always be ethical in similar situations. No act in itself is immoral⁴; rather, the determination of morality or immorality, ethicality or unethicity, requires first a set of circumstances or an environment and then a standard against which to measure. Religion provides that standard for our society, whether or not the individuals in our society choose to subscribe to religion or acknowledge the existence of God. Laws, since they are made by society through its fallable human representatives, can be immoral or unethical. For laws to be used as a basis for ethical determinations, the laws themselves need to be compared with the absolute ethical standards.

Those not in conflict can be used as standards; those that do conflict need to be changed to eliminate the contradictions. Leaders who make judgments on the morality or ethicality of national or organizational policies and objectives must use these laws of religion and society to make those judgments.

The last of the points raised in the quote from Gabriel concerns the ethical obligation of a leader to resist or refuse an unethical or immoral order in an appropriate manner. The point of discussion is that which constitutes an appropriate manner of resistance or refusal. In the United States Army we do not have a strong or much-publicized tradition of refusal to obey orders, moral or immoral. What has developed is a highly-complex system of passive-aggressive behaviors designed to resist the implementation of undesirable orders. These passive-aggressive behaviors include the deliberate misinterpretation of orders; the literal interpretation of orders without consideration of the intent of those orders; stalling and procrastination; the reorganization of priorities, resources, or the organization itself; the institution of studies, the organization of committees, or the use of formal staffing procedures; the loose interpretation of orders; and the failure to address the subject or issue in an order. In an interview for this paper, a colonel gave the following example of this last behavior:

In Vietnam I was an advisor to an RVN Infantry unit. I had been in that job for several months when we got a new boss without any combat experience. One evening, shortly after he arrived, one of our outposts several kilometers away came under heavy attack. I knew from prior experience that the Viet Cong weren't interested in the outpost; they were interested in ambushing the relief column

that they knew we would send. I told the new senior advisor what I thought, but he insisted that I take the relief column directly to the outpost over the shortest route. I just knew that this would end up with us getting ambushed and the outpost being overrun. Once we left the base I talked to my counterpart, the commander of the relief column, and we decided to envelop the likely ambush areas and not go directly to the outpost. Whenever the senior advisor called on the radio asking if we had gotten to the outpost, I said, "no." When he asked for our position, I gave it to him. I guess that if he had plotted the positions on a map he could have seen that we were taking the long way to get to the objective, but he must not have done that. Anyway, the sites we selected as probable ambush locations proved to be accurate and we destroyed a lot of the enemy and ruined their ambushes. The outpost was not overrun. If we had gone the way the senior advisor wanted us to go, I probably wouldn't be here today. Was I unethical in doing what I did? I don't really know, but I do know that under the same set of circumstances, I'd do it again. If I's ever been taken to task for what I did, I'd have been comfortable defending my position and my actions.

The colonel who shared this experience did raise the issue of his concern with his senior advisor's course of action and was given orders that ignored his concerns. He chose to execute his own course of action and not address the advisability of his senior's course of action any further. Unless his position reports had been plotted on the map, his senior would have no way of knowing of the "modification" that had taken place in the orders. Was the action of the junior advisor ethical? He rationalized his disobedience by basing his actions on his prior experience in similar situations and by his not having falsified his position reports when his senior advisor asked for them. His actions were functional to the organization in that the organization survived to fight again. If, however, the test for an ethical imperative is applied, the situation becomes less clear. Should all orders given by inexperienced leaders be disobeyed when they conflict with the opinions of experienced subordinates? Should any officer, after dissenting to his superior, disobey an order from that

superior that he knows will not only result in the death of his men, but will not even accomplish the mission? If the answer to either of these questions is affirmative, then the actions of the junior advisor were ethical. What would have been the ethicality of the actions of the junior advisor had there been no ambushes and had the outpost been overrun? How ethical was the conduct of the senior advisor when he ignored the advice and counsel of his experienced subordinate to pursue his own course of action? If the senior advisor's actions were unethical (as they probably were when the possible consequences of those actions are considered), was the ethicality of the situation improved by the disobedience of the junior advisor? Gabriel has stated that leaders have an obligation not to obey immoral orders. Was the senior advisor's order immoral, unethical, ill-advised or illegal? Besides disobedience, what other courses of action were available to the junior advisor? Did the junior advisor do the "right" thing? How does one reconcile doing the "right" thing with doing the ethical thing?

Questions such as these are best asked in the safety of an office or in a classroom. Leaders are trained to make decisions based on the best information available to them at the moment. In the situation described above, the junior advisor was fully prepared to accept the responsibility for his actions. While his actions fell within the ethical belt of acceptability for the organization, they probably fell short of the absolute pole of the ethical continuum, or the ethical imperative. The short-term consequences of his actions were functional; the long-term consequences of his actions are unknown. Had this incidence of disobedience precipitated a rash of similar disobediences, chaos would have been the inevitable result.

The long-term consequences of the action would then have been organizationally dysfunctional and unethical. In making the difficult ethical decisions required by the dictates of the situation, Toner (1977) offers this comment:

Because of its belief in a higher morality in a God, the American nation can hardly do otherwise than to recognize the soldier's conscience as complementary to and not necessarily destructive of military discipline. . . . Should circumstances require him to choose between the two, honor obliges him to be responsible for his actions and to accept willingly and manfully the consequences of his choice.⁵

All soldiers must take moral responsibility for their actions. No soldier may perform any action if he genuinely sees that action as being immoral or unethical. In a case where there is a conflict between ethical imperatives, each leader must assess the situation and follow the dictates of his conscience. Loyalty and obedience must therefore be limited by morality, by the moral obligation of soldiers not to obey immoral orders, regardless of the personal consequences that could result from that disobedience.

What is it that has quieted dissent in the Army and allowed immoral or unethical policies, decisions and actions to go largely unchallenged? Gabriel suggests that the largest single factor is a careerism that has made individual promotion and personal advancement a paramount concern over all other considerations and obligations. The dysfunctional aspects (it is difficult to identify the organizationally functional aspects of careerism) have been discussed in an earlier chapter. Careerism is not just a disease that flourishes in the military alone. Its roots lie in a narcissistic

segment of society that worships the instant gratification of individual desires and moans loudly about spending money to implement social programs designed to alleviate the hunger, pain, suffering and ignorance of the disadvantaged; a segment of society in which the search for legal loopholes to avoid personal and financial responsibilities has been developed to a fine art. The selfish and self-serving characteristics of careerism are no more than reflections of the "me first" philosophy of a segment of the larger society the military serves. Unlike society, however, those who serve in the military have an oath to assist them in establishing priorities for their values and behaviors. They should be aware of the organizationally dysfunctional nature of careerism and ruthlessly eliminate it whenever and wherever it is found. Careerism, if allowed to develop unchecked, can emasculate the integrity of its leaders by making them vulnerable to ethical blackmail. If career progression is one's most important value, it is difficult to stand up for what one believes to be right when the consequence of that stance is career stagnation or ruination. One should not confuse personal ambition with careerism. The desire to achieve status is not careerism until that desire is taken to the egoistic extreme where achievement of status takes precedence over organizational goal attainment, a situation that harms the organization as a whole. The military organization can facilitate the reordering of personal values by rewarding moral behavior and ethical courage while ruthlessly punishing careerism. All that is required is the courage of leaders to identify the desired moral and ethical values, announce the standards and strictly enforce policies that support those standards. The task is made

more difficult by those careerist leaders who impede necessary policy enforcement.

In addition to careerism and some subsocietal values, another contributor to the demise of meaningful dissent could be the lack of a tradition of dissent in the military. The founding fathers of the country were intent on insuring that the nation never be subjected to a "man on horseback," a military dictator. Constitutional guarantees for civilian control of the military were established and reinforced to preclude just such an eventuality. The military, in an attempt to insure that no threat to civilian control of the government could possibly be perceived by anyone, may have overcompensated in the pursuit of that goal by discouraging dissent in the military organization as well as between the military leaders and the government. A tradition of unquestioning obedience may have been established and reinforced as a virtue to insure that society would never perceive the military to be a threat to democracy. " . . . In the twenty-year period between 1960 and 1980, . . . only one general officer, Major General George Rawney, resigned in public protest over policy and that over Salt II. During that same time period, twenty-seven officers of flag rank in the Canadian forces resigned in public protest over questions of policy. The contrast is stunning."⁶ In any event, the absence of a recent tradition of dissent in the United States military contributes to the difficulty in identifying acceptable methods for dissent today.

The identification of legitimate methods of dissent in and by the military is further complicated by the precarious balance an Army leader must maintain among the bureaucratic, professional, and governmental agency

aspects of the military. Figure 11 illustrates these three different aspects.⁷ The area in which these overlap is the arena in which the military leader functions.




Figure 11. Three Aspects of the Military Organization.

The military is a bureaucracy for many reasons. It has a hierarchy and advancement is based ideally on demonstrated expertise (as compared to a Gerentocracy, in which the eldest get promoted first). There are written rules and regulations covering nearly every anticipatable behavior. Leaders in the military bureaucracy tend to be office-holders rather than personalities; we identify correspondence by office symbols rather than by the names of the correspondents. In a bureaucracy, leaders are identified impersonally in the organization. Captains and colonels with various specialty codes are looked upon as being interchangeable in their grade and specialty. The institutional memory in a bureaucracy is the filing system, the source to which leaders turn to find out how a specific task was accomplished last time.

The military is also a governmental agency. It is based in federal law. Critical decisions are made outside the organization. For instance, the military does not decide with whom it goes to war; in fact, it does not even control its own budget. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution requires Congress to maintain an army. Article 2, Section 2 authorizes the President to establish an officers corps. Officers therefore are creatures of the Republic; all other leaders are creatures of the organization. For this reason officers have the greater responsibility to the nation for moral and ethical conduct. Other leaders are responsible to the organization.

The military is also a profession. As do other professions, it has controlled admission. Not everyone who applies for enlistment is accepted; not all who complete officer training programs are brought onto active duty. Officers tend to be accepted on faith that they have the potential for successfully handling authority and responsibility, while non-commissioned officers are observed carefully before appointment to positions of responsibility. The military professionals receive specialized training, just as other professionals do. They learn the fundamentals of their profession in the classroom and develop their skills in a controlled system of practical application and experience. Most professions exercise a monopoly on their skills and knowledge. The military is no exception. If a soldier becomes disenchanted with the military, he cannot leave his organization and join a competitor on the other side of town. He must choose to serve or not to serve in the nation's only military organization. Autonomy is also a characteristic of a profession. That autonomy is given by society because society does not possess the detailed knowledge and experience required for effective criticism. This autonomy has been

lessened in recent years by contracted agencies employing retired officer advisors and other military experts. The military profession maintains a sense of corporateness. Members wear the same clothes, speak a special jargon and tend to identify with one another. When one member is subjected to attack from outside the profession, all members feel that attack to some degree. The corporateness and autonomy of the military profession can lead to an isolationism similar to that experienced in the period between World Wars One and Two. During that period, the military developed into a sub-society, with little interest in what happened outside the profession. Another characteristic of a profession is the requirement for self-criticism. The American Medical Association and other professional organizations make those self-criticism regularly, but only rarely does one find an article critical of military policy or actions in our own professional journals. I can remember only one critical article in Military Review, for instance, in the last five years. Closely correlated with the requirement for self-criticism is the professional characteristic of a self-administered ethical code. The Army does not have a formal ethical code. The "Don't lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do" honor code guidance is about the closest thing the Army has to a formal code of ethics. Arguments for and against a formal ethical code have gone on for years and the Army is no closer to a conclusion now than when the arguments began. The conclusion has been reached that ethics needs to be taught, however. Teaching ethics without an ethical code almost seems like teaching geometry without a textbook or horsemanship without a horse.

The implications of the three facets of the military character are several, but the greatest implication for the leader is that he must exist and perform his leadership function where the three circles in figure 11

overlap. As a bureaucrat, he must focus on the organization as the basis for his power. Acting as a governmental agent, his focus must be on the policy. As a professional, he is required to focus on the client, which in this case is the American society. The ethical leader in the military must maintain a precarious balance among his several roles if he is to meet all of his responsibilities and obligations.

If the leader does not maintain an adequate balance among his roles, problems result. If he shifts too far towards the bureaucracy, short-term organizational benefits eventually lead to disaster. An example of this is General Koster's cover-up of the My Lai incident. In his quest to protect his division (and perhaps himself), he did not give adequate considerations to his responsibilities to the government and to society. The result was scandal, a ruined career and a defaming of the Army as a whole. The division whose reputation he sought to protect no longer even exists, but the unethicity, even immorality, of his actions are still remembered.

When a leader allows himself to overemphasize his professional role, he loses credibility with the government and can no longer function as a government agent. When General MacArthur dissented with the policies of President Truman over the conduct of the Korean War, he took his dissent directly to the client, the American people. Since he was no longer operating within the framework of the government, it became impossible for him to function as an agent of that government. His usefulness to the government, the organization, and society was therefore greatly diminished. The president needed a commander who could and would implement policy and supply feedback to the President; General MacArthur did not agree with the

policy and disobeyed the President's orders by taking his argument directly to the society. President Truman really had no choice but to replace General MacArthur with someone who would operate within the system. Had General MacArthur resigned in protest to presidential policy, he would have left the military with moral right on his side; being relieved for disobeying orders stripped him of any chance he might have had of changing policy for moral or ethical reasons.

Perhaps a no more dangerous action can happen than for a leader to overemphasize his responsibility to the policy. General Haig left the Army to work on the White House staff, returned to the military (two grades higher than when he left) and then returned to the political world as Secretary of State. If ever the opportunity existed for the "the man on horseback," the military dictator, to emerge, it was then. Secretary Haig's comments about being in charge during the early hours of the emergency precipitated by the attempted assassination of President Reagan incited considerable concern among members of the press and among those members of Congress who thought that Secretary Haig really did want to take over the responsibilities associated with being President, although Haig denies that this was ever his intent. The concern of this nation's founding fathers over protecting the country from military takeover seems to have been transmitted to succeeding generations.

For a leader in the military to act ethically and to fulfill his obligations to society, the government and the organization, he must be allowed to express his dissent with policies, actions and orders when he genuinely believes a moral or ethical dilemma exists or will be created by his obedience to those policies and orders. His responsibility is to

dissent; his leader's responsibility is to allow the dissent and hear what he says. Some mechanism must be established to facilitate the communication of the dissent to the appropriate person or agency. Dissent to people or agencies outside the organization does not achieve the desired effect for the individual nor for the organization. For dissent to be effective, it must be heard by those with the power to remedy the problem.

How, then, does a leader exercise his moral obligation to dissent with that for which he has genuine and severe ethical concern? The first step along the path to the resolution of an ethical dilemma is to voice concern over the situation. The possibility exists that the person or agency responsible for the issuance of the order, policy or activity did not fully understand the moral or ethical consequences that could follow and would be as eager as the troubled leader to find a solution for the dilemma. It is also possible that the perception of the leader is distorted and in speaking up he is allowing the appropriate person to clarify the issue. This course of action requires that the concerned leader have the moral courage to stand up and voice his concern. In doing so he forfeits his anonymity and can no longer be just a face in the crowd. He risks being labeled unsupportive, disloyal or a troublemaker. He does, however, fulfill his moral obligation to himself, the organization, and the nation.

A second method for protest is to appeal an immoral or unethical order to a higher headquarters. It is certain that no policy exists anywhere in the country that permits the issuance of immoral orders as a matter of official policy. If the ethical dilemma cannot be resolved at the point of origin of the order, the next higher headquarters should be allowed to mediate the conflicting views. The same dangers for the dissenter exist in

this course of action. The same responsibilities are also still operant. In the Army the Inspector General channels are useful in the pursuit of this course of action when the problem is internal to the organization. When very senior leaders in the military must voice moral concern for orders that originate among the senior civilian leadership external from the organization, this method is less effective. The problem is that senior leaders must dissent to leaders outside of the military organization, where mechanisms may not exist for dealing with dissent or where the responsibility for the action provoking moral concern is spread among several people or agencies.

Perhaps the next logical step in a leader's attempt to resolve an ethical dilemma is to request relief from his duties, citing those specific orders that cause him moral concern and the specific reasons for which he considers those orders to be illegal, unethical, or immoral. The request should be both oral and written. The strength of this course of action lies in the requirement for the recipient of this request for relief to forward it thorough the system, an action that forces many leaders at different levels in the organization to hear the protest and to react to it. The leader has met his ethical responsibility for voicing his dissent with an immoral order. The dangers in this course of action are the same as for the other alternatives. If senior leaders decide that the moral objection was without basis, relief from duty could have a decidedly negative effect on the career of the dissenter. Career implications cannot abrogate personal responsibilities for voicing dissent over moral issues. If careerism is to be diminished, the tough decisions on moral issues must be made in favor of the maintenance of moral and ethical standards, regardless of personal consequences. Similarly, senior leaders must be sensitive to the ethical

responsibilities of subordinates and reward their efforts to maintain high standards of moral and ethical conduct, even if the maintenance of those standards requires that they must refuse to be associated with an action or order that requires immoral or unethical behavior.

Refusal to obey an immoral or unethical order may become necessary if no other alternative is found in seeking relief from obeying that order. If all other attempts to modify or change an immoral order or policy fail, a leader still has the obligation to act ethically. Moral and ethical responsibility does not end for the leader with the voicing of his objection to an immoral order. That responsibility extends to all his behaviors. To object to an immoral order and still obey it is to act immorally. Responsibility for the immoral action still belongs to the person committing the act regardless of the orders he received or the objections he made. Others may share in the culpability, but basic responsibility for the action remains that of the person who performs the action.

"The most obvious way in which an officer can demonstrate his disagreement with or moral outrage towards a policy is to resign from the profession as an act of public protest. He must leave the service and his profession, and seek to influence his government from the outside as a citizen."⁸ Clearly this tactic is most effective when used by a general officer. The resignation of a lieutenant over a moral issue gathers little attention outside his own small organization, but the resignation or retirement of a senior officer in protest to an immoral or unethical governmental policy can generate national attention. Although leaders in other armies find this to be a viable method for calling attention to unconscionable policies and orders, the practice has not generally been used

in the United States Army in recent decades. It seems unlikely that senior army leaders have found no policies, orders or actions morally objectionable. It may be more likely that patterns of behavior for dealing with moral and ethical issues for twenty or more years while officers progress from junior lieutenants to general officers become so ingrained that it becomes difficult to depart from those behaviors once flag rank is achieved. By that time careerism has done its work and numbed the officer toward ethical issues. It may also be possible that senior officers have been misplacing their loyalties and forgetting their moral responsibilities to the nation. Perhaps the greatest single requirement for upgrading the ethical posture of the military today is to reacquaint the leadership of the military with their moral and ethical responsibilities for dissent.

A negative fantasy that exists in the minds of some of those who strive to improve the ethical standards for conduct in the military is that the ethical and moral officers of courage will stand up in protest to immoral orders and policies and ultimately resign or prematurely retire from the military, while the careerists who have spent years avoiding ethical confrontation move up to senior positions in the military. One can almost see them rubbing their hands gleefully as one of their moral peers symbolically falls on his sword over an ethical issue, chanting, "one less, one less." Fortunately, this is only a negative fantasy. If that fantasy were reality, no attention would be given to moral and ethical issues in the military today. The reality of the situation is that the senior military leadership is concerned with improving the ethical climate of the military and of those agencies outside the organization with whom they interact. Major efforts have been made at the service academies, as well as in the

staff and war colleges to increase leader awareness of moral and ethical responsibilities. Awareness is not enough, however. In conjunction with moral and ethical awareness must come a change in the manner in which we conduct business in the military. That change must be demanded at the top and implemented simultaneously at all levels in the organization to insure that those who act ethically are not eliminated from the organization or do not themselves choose to leave the organization for ethical or moral reasons. Those very leaders with the courage and moral fiber to dissent over ethical issues are the leaders we most need to retain in the military. What the organization does not need are the moral cowards who avoid ethical issues and manipulate themselves to lofty positions from which they can corrupt those who serve beneath them.

How can moral change be effected in the military? There are three basic ways to accomplish change. The first is to stand up for that which is right (or morality) whenever wrong (immorality) is identified. If all leaders did this, the ethical belt of acceptability for behavior in the organization would rapidly move to the absolute pole on the ethical continuum. Those whose standards for behavior did not meet minimum organizational standards would quickly be allowed to leave the organization. If only a few leaders stand up for that which is moral or ethical whenever abuses are identified, those few officers are in real danger of being labeled as zealots and finding themselves ostracized from the organization. Professionally they stand in danger of being crushed and cast aside in the competition for promotion and career progression. They will, however, have met their moral and ethical responsibilities and have demonstrated the courage of their convictions. These are leaders to be admired.

The second way to effect change in the organization is to leave the organization and work for that change through outside agencies. This method is most effective for senior leaders, for by leaving the organization in moral protest they may attract widespread attention and popular support from society and from governmental officials. More junior officers attract little attention or support and may be quickly forgotten. The problem with this method for effecting change is that those who leave the organization run the risk of losing validity in the organization they leave. They also risk being perceived as someone who ran when things got tough. Even if this is not the case, those who leave the organization find that they are quickly forgotten and lose whatever influence they might have had with members of the organization who chose to remain. When that occurs, the chance to effect organizational change diminishes radically.

The third method for effecting organizational changes is to inventory that which is wrong in the organization, avoid open conflict, compromise principle for promotion and wait until one has risen to the top of the organizational hierarchy, when one has the power to change all those things that have been identified as being wrong. The problem with this course of action is that by the time the leader rises to a position from which he can effect change, he has lost the need to make the change. Years of rationalization can distort values. The leader who starts out wanting to stamp out careerism finds himself a careerist. He takes on the characteristics of that which he started out to change and will rationalize that happening by saying that the organization doesn't need to change; after all, didn't it select him for this position of power? Certainly that selection proved the merit of the organization and its systems.

It would be easy to decide that positive ethical change is unlikely and that those who are bothered by moral and ethical issues should find some other areas in which to serve. That decision is not one that would benefit the military organization. Each leader must try to make those changes he believes to be necessary for ethical conduct. Each leader must also be prepared to display the courage to carry dissent over moral issues to the point of disobedience to immoral orders and resignation from the military over moral issues. If leaders cannot risk their careers over moral and ethical issues, how can they be relied upon to risk their lives when they are called upon to do so by their country? The willingness to risk is an indication that the leader is capable of courageous action. The taking of the risk is a demonstration of courage, be it on the battlefield or in testimony before a congressional committee. It takes courage to place moral responsibility above career, loyalty to one's unit, and obedience to orders. When leaders find themselves faced with an ethical dilemma, they should not ask themselves what is best for them, but rather they should ask if they have the courage to stand up for what is right.

CHAPTER 6

FORMING ETHICAL VALUES

Values begin to be formed as soon as an individual is capable of conscious thought and are learned from those we consider to be significant in our lives. Those persons include parents, clergy, neighbors and siblings as well as our peers. Value-forming institutions are the family, the church, schools, and jobs.¹ Freud stated that the basic values that determine personality are formed by age six; however, it seems clear that values can be changed and new values can be added throughout a person's life. A requirement for any change in values on the part of the individual is the realization that values he presently holds are inadequate or do not serve him well in the environment in which he lives and works. The individual must feel the need to change those values and then take steps to acquire the inputs he needs to adjust his values.

By the time the military acquires new soldiers and leaders they have already established a basic value system that has served them with varying degrees of success during their early years. These value systems may or may not be correlated highly with those values deemed necessary for success in the military. It becomes the job of the leader to determine those individual values possessed by the new soldier that are functional to the organization and the accomplishment of its goals and then reinforce them. Similarly, it is also the task of the leader to identify those values of new soldiers that are dysfunctional to organizational goal attainment and to assist the soldier in making the necessary changes to those values. Many soldiers, for instance, enter the military with a value for self-interest that takes priority over a value of helping others. In many sub-societies

this value has been necessary to exist. It is not, however, a basic value that enhances teamwork and cohesion. It also does little to insure moral or ethical behavior towards others. The leader must identify this situation and take those steps required to assist the soldier in making a value adjustment that will assist him in becoming an effective member of the organization and a contributor to the organization's efforts to accomplish specific tasks. This process is often referred to as motivating the soldier.

Motivation may be defined as the internal values, beliefs and attitudes of an individual which cause him or her to perform an action. Individual motivation is the cause of the action; a person is motivated to perform (or not to perform) an action because that action is the most attractive option available to him at the moment. Motivation is internal. A soldier cannot be "motivated" by others, in the true sense of the word, unless he wants to be motivated. He can, however, be activated to perform tasks. Activation of a soldier requires the use of rewards or coercion, or the use of the power inherent in the position of the leader tasked with the accomplishment of a mission requiring the efforts of subordinates.

Figure 12 compares the characteristics of both motivation and activation. From this figure we can see that behaviors can be generated by either the motivation of the individual to perform a task or by a leader directing an individual to perform a task. If a soldier is motivated to accomplish a task, he does it because he wants to do whatever the task is more than anything else available for him to do at the moment. In performing the task, he will be diligent, innovative, conscientious, and eager to do the best job possible. He will take pride in his efforts and

can be relied upon to work at the task even in the absence of supervision. No reward for the action is necessary or expected, but occasional positive reinforcement will do much to insure his continued motivation to perform that or a similar task.

Motivation is: internal - learned { values
 beliefs - generates behavior
 attitudes

Activation is: external - directed - generates behavior

Figure 12. Comparison of Motivation/Activation Characteristics

Activation, on the other hand, requires the use of coercion or the promise of reward, either implied or stated, to generate a desired behavior from a subordinate. A subordinate who is activated to perform a task will do what he is told to do as long as he is supervised. He will do only what he is required to do, will exhibit no innovation and will look for ways to avoid the task when not supervised. An activated soldier will take no particular pride in his work. The amount of reward or coercion required to accomplish a task must constantly be increased to insure compliance. Soldiers very quickly develop a tolerance for rewards and punishments. Letters of appreciation eventually lose meaning and medals are expected. Shouting loses its activation value as the soldier learns to say, "Pay no attention to Top. He isn't happy unless he's yelling at somebody." Civilian incentive pay loses its impact ("A \$25 bond just isn't worth a year of breaking my back."). Leaders who rely heavily on activating soldiers usually complain about the poor quality of their subordinates and think that

leaders in general are overworked. They tend to appear tired and do not look forward to going to work in the morning. These conditions are caused by pushing subordinates instead of leading them.

The Army has learned the difference between activation and motivation in its enlistment efforts. For years the Army sought to increase the rewards for enlistment. Beer in the billets, huge pay raises and enlistment bonuses, college dormitory - style barracks, elimination of the pass as a privilege and many other actions were all used to induce (activate) young men and women to enlist in the Army. All of these efforts were inadequate in the procurement and maintenance of a dedicated, disciplined, combat-ready professional Army because the Army placed emphasis on buying people, not on raising and maintaining an Army. Soldiers expected an external reward for everything they did; they became mercenaries in the true sense of the word. The most recent recruiting slogan, "Be all that you can be," places the expectation of reward for enlistment on individual growth as the result of team membership. The implication is that a soldier will grow and achieve by adhering to Army values. Success therefore becomes a personal responsibility and challenge. The new soldier is motivated to achieve by accepting the Army challenge to succeed. The payoff to the soldier is internal, not external.

The implication so far is that motivation is desirable and activation is undesirable. That is not necessarily true. Many times motivating soldiers to accomplish a task is virtually impossible, especially if time is a consideration. Because motivation is based on learned values, beliefs and attitudes, change in motivation requires a change in or addition to these same values, beliefs, and attitudes. Change requires time.

Learning values has been said to take place in three stages: compliance, identification, and internalization. Initially, compliance with an Army value may be sufficient. A new soldier complies with the requirement for the proper wearing of the uniform. As the soldier becomes used to the uniform and becomes more experienced, he begins to identify with the uniform and others who wear it. Later, as the soldier commits himself to the military, the uniform becomes a symbol of the professional soldier, a concept that he has internalized. By then the proper wearing of the uniform has become a value indicating professionalism, patriotism, and dedication - all characteristics he hopes to possess. The time that elapses between compliance with an order and the internalization of the concept upon which the order was based must vary among individuals, but probably can be measured in terms of weeks, months, or even years. The time required to activate a soldier to comply with leader orders can probably be measured in terms of seconds.

| <u>Motivation</u> | <u>Activation</u> |
|--|--|
| INTERNAL | EXTERNAL |
| Requires personal, learned values, beliefs, attitudes | Requires leader values, beliefs, attitudes |
| Requires learning to change values, beliefs, attitudes | Requires compliance only, not learning |
| Requires time to learn | INSTANTANEOUS |

Figure 13. Motivation/Activation Comparison

Initiating an attack under combat conditions may be as simple as issuing an order and demanding compliance. Certainly many successful attacks have been conducted in just that way. Activation for compliance has the

advantage of being quick and it accomplishes a mission. The process of motivating soldiers to conduct an attack is a greater challenge for leadership because soldiers are being called upon to risk their lives. Going back to the original definition for motivation, risking one's life is probably not as an attractive option as staying in the relative safety of one's foxhole. Making the life-risking option more attractive than the safety option demands leader understanding of soldier motivation and the values upon which motivation are based. During World War Two, General Creighton Abrams, then a Lieutenant Colonel commanding a tank battalion, is reported to have motivated his soldiers to attack during the early phases of the Battle of the Bulge by telling them, "The shortest way home is East. Attack. Attack. Attack." General Abrams was aware of the soldiers' desire to finish the war and to go home. Rather than spend time and energy trying to convince his soldiers that the danger of combat was an attractive alternative to safety, he found a way to wed individual values and goals with the unit's mission. The troops were motivated to conduct the attack, not necessarily to seize a piece of terrain, but to shorten the war and to go home. Because they were motivated and not activated, General Abrams could count on his troops to do the very best they could to accomplish the mission.

Sometimes motivating soldiers to perform a task is more difficult than in the example cited above. Take, for example, the requirement to mow grass on a parade field. It will be a difficult task to motivate soldiers to push lawn mowers all day, especially since mowing lawns does not fit into the soldier image with which the troops identify. Mowing lawns fits instead

with the teen-age, high-school, parental-dominance image. Activation may be all that a leader can hope for in this situation, relying on development of patterns of disciplined behavior and the reinforcement of values of cleanliness and orderliness to be the long-term gains to be made from the mowing experience.

Accomplishing unit missions requires that the leader understand the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of motivation and activation. The leader should understand how changes in motivation are accomplished and needs to be aware of the lessening impact of rewards and punishments as a means for activating soldiers to accomplish a task. The leader must also be aware that motivating soldiers and other leaders to accomplish a task is not always possible and that they need not always spend the time and energy required to motivate subordinates. Sometimes activation is enough.

FM 22-100, the Army's Leadership manual, cites a number of principles, most of which have been covered in this text, either directly or by implication. In motivating soldiers, learning must take place. The example set by the leader in his daily contact with subordinates should teach all with whom he comes in contact exactly what he expects in terms of behavior and standards. A leader who cuts ethical corners should not be surprised when subordinates cut those same corners, too.

Ethical behavior is not a value that is intrinsic to every soldier and leader that enters the military. Many situations in the society from which they are drawn actually support an argument in favor of unethical behavior. Cheating on taxes, hiring others to write term papers (and even dissertations), obtaining quick divorces as a means of setting aside

marriage vows, and observing the treatment by the courts of persons actually caught in the commission of crimes does little to encourage an individual value for absolutely ethical behavior among those who enter the military. Even those in the military sometimes succumb to temptation and prostitute their ethical values for a short-term gain or benefit. The reinforcement of the value for ethical behavior becomes, therefore, a dynamic requirement that grows and changes in some way almost daily.

Values become the system through which possible courses of action are filtered in thought and decision-making processes. Ethical values therefore play an important role in the establishment of ethical leader demands that are translated into actions that in turn accomplish tasks. Figure 14 illustrates this filtering process. The maintenance of an effective filter




Figure 14. The Function of an Ethical Values Filter.

of ethical values can contribute greatly to an ethical command climate and a further reinforcement of an ethical values system. Like a screen designed to keep out flies, a hole in the ethical filter allows unethical courses of action to generate unethical and immoral behavior. The filter must

constantly be inspected for holes and patched quickly where necessary if ethical conduct is expected to flourish unimpeded.

Just how tight the ethical filter must be is a function of how close to the absolute ethical pole the senior leadership of the military desires the behaviors of the organization to be. This decision for ethical standards has to be made at the top of the leadership structure or else contradicting guidance will be furnished by subordinate leaders. At one time, for instance, sexual promiscuity was encouraged by one senior commander ("If the troops won't [fornicate] then the troops won't fight."), while another senior leader in a different major command eliminated from the service any leader who showed any tendency towards promiscuity. Imagine the confusion of subordinates who transferred from one command to the other. Two or more different standards for moral and ethical conduct can lead to confusion, cynicism, and lower organizational efficiency levels. Another example of difficulties that arise from non-specific standards is the application of non-fraternization rules. The Department of the Army guidance was designed specifically to be vague in order to allow subordinate commanders the maximum amount of flexibility in the interpretation and enforcement of the rule. The rule was designed to prevent the exploitation of one person by another, more senior person, through the use of the power that comes from position or rank in the organization. A secondary motive for the order was to prevent the exploitation of a senior by an unscrupulous subordinate. The result has been complete confusion. Bosses Nights and Strong Right Arm Nights still take place in officers and non-commissioned officers clubs at the same posts where officers and non-commissioned officers are not allowed

to go fishing together under local interpretation of the non-fraternization rule. It would almost seem that alcohol and tobacco smoke lends legitimacy to fraternization. At one post a male captain was chastized for courting a female captain because the male was an instructor in the Officers Basic Course and the female was a student in the Officers Advanced Course, a situation that precluded any professional contact. Once they married, however, there were no problems with the interpretation of the non-fraternization rule. One wonders how the rule will be interpreted should they not both be promoted on the same day.²

In any behavior there is an actor, an act, a short-term consequence and any number of long-term consequences. The number of long-term consequences can influence the formation of the ethical values filter. In an environment that demands behaviors that fall very close to the absolute pole of the ethical continuum, all of the possible consequences of a proposed action must be anticipated and evaluated for ethicality and morality. Ethical values functioning as filters for behavior must be imposed for not only the short-term consequence, but for each of the anticipated long-term consequences. Figure 15 illustrates the concept. In a leadership environment that is only concerned with the short-term consequences of an action, the ethical filter can be much smaller. However, the ethicality of the behaviors exhibited by members of the organization will fall much closer to the extemporaneous pole on the ethical continuum than when ethical filters are established for all long-term consequences. The problem is that even though a commander considers only the ethicality of the act in terms of the short-term consequences, long-term consequences of that act still occur

and still can contribute to the ethical dilemmas faced by leaders in the organization. Saying that long-term consequences do not exist does not make it true. The ostrich approach to threats of danger doesn't even work for




Figure 15. Actor-Act-Consequences Continuum.³

the ostrich, much less for an organizational leader. If a strong moral and ethical command climate is to exist in an organization, all the implications of a course of action must be considered.

In figure 15, the actor is concerned with why he performs the action. He examines ethicality of his motives and compares that with his value system, and with the organization's value system (shown combined in Figure 15 as the Ethical Values Filters), which should limit the number of options open to him. Organizational ethical values limit the options for behavior acceptable to the organization, for theoretically leaders should have a better understanding of the long-term implications of an act than the actor does. The next ethical concern is for the character or nature of the act itself, and how that compares with personal and organizational ethical standards. Short-term consequences are the next concern, the immediate, measurable results of the action. Did the act do what it was supposed to do? Were there any unforeseen immediate consequences that had not been

anticipated? Was the result good or bad in terms of goal attainment and ethicality? Long-term consequences require time to assess, but the same ethical concerns should be operant.

On several occasions in Vietnam it was reported that prisoners were thrown from helicopters in an attempt to extract intelligence data from those prisoners aboard the aircraft who were not thrown out. The concern of the actors in these cases was probably for the acquisition of factual and timely data that would result in the destruction of the enemy while saving American lives. The individuals or actors who caused the prisoners to die probably had become so accustomed to death that the killing of one prisoner had little meaning. It is probable that leaders in the organizations who experienced incidents of this kind perpetuated the dehumanization of the enemy by encouraging the use of racially-derogatory terms and using euphemisms such as "target servicing" instead of talking of the killing of people in the target area. In their view the actors were therefore not murdering people; they were exterminating vermin and saving American lives in the process. They may have felt that they were strong men, doing what was necessary, and should have been admired. Their ethical filter had some gaping holes, and the leadership played ostrich. The nature of the act does not deserve much comment. It takes a lot of rationalization to make murder in violation of every moral and legal tradition of the civilized world a virtue, and I will not attempt that in the few pages available here. Perhaps the act was performable only because the character or nature of the act was never investigated. Perhaps the expediency of the moment and the desperate need for information made this act acceptable to a very few people in a very few instances. Perhaps. The short-term consequences were that

the remaining prisoners told all they knew and, if they didn't know anything, they undoubtedly made up information. When measured in terms of results, the action produced good results, only if the deaths of the prisoners is conveniently forgotten, for their deaths were a consequence of the action, too. What were the long-term consequences of the action? Perhaps the actors still hear the dying screams of a prisoner and still see him as he fell to his death in the countryside below, twisting and thrashing as much as the bindings that held him would allow. Perhaps they were too insensitive to be conscience-stricken and participated in several more of these incidents, justifying the means by a portion of the ends achieved. The prisoners who survived the flight may have survived the war to recount their experiences at home. What the diplomatic consequences of their stories have been and what they will continue to be in the years to come we will perhaps never know. We do know that the hypothesis, "If you grab 'em by the crotch, their hearts and minds will follow," did not prove to be accurate in the end. What was achieved was activation, not motivation, among the prisoners. Incidents such as those described here insured that people subjected to the immoral or unethical behaviors (and who survived) complied with orders but never identified with or internalized the values that the organization hoped to instill. What was internalized was a hatred for everything for which the organization stood. One has only to read the literature written by our own prisoners who returned from North Vietnam to document this truth.⁴

A dimension of consequences not investigated so far is the spiritual aspect of immoral, unethical behavior. A number of leaders and an even greater percentage of subordinates become quite uneasy when spiritual matters are discussed, but the fact remains that for persons who have faith

in God there is a greater consequence for their action than any that an organizational leader can imagine. That is not to say that a non-believer can act as he pleases without regard for spiritual consequences. He may suffer those, anyway. A true non-believer in God simply will not worry about the spiritual consequences of his actions until it is too late. Since the society we serve is based on the Judeo-Christian ethical system, and since there are so few confirmed atheists when hostile fire is tearing up the earth around a soldier's feet, perhaps a brief discussion of the spiritual implications of behavior is in order.

When spiritual implications for secular behavior are considered, it becomes necessary to modify Figure 15 somewhat. In addition to the actor, the ethical filter, and the act itself, the consequences of the act now can be categorized into these earthly consequences and those spiritual consequences. Figure 16 illustrates the concept. The actor still must be




Figure 16. Actor - Spiritual Consequences Continuum.

concerned with his motivations for accomplishing the action, but this time the standard for ethical or moral conduct is not secular; it is spiritual. There does not seem to be an ethical belt of acceptability for behavior when

measured against a spiritual standard. Behavior either meets the standard or it does not. The ethical filter established by organizational values is supplemented with spiritual values, making the filter even more difficult to penetrate. The nature of the act is still open to assessment, but this time it is open to assessment by God, not a senior organizational leader. Earthly consequences cannot be measured against the attainment of organizational goals or long-term consequences to men and society alone, although they may be considered. Of more importance is the comparison of earthly consequences with spiritual law. The morality of the consequences must be measured against Holy law. The attainment of tactical information is of little consequence when it involves a murder. The spiritual consequences then must be a natural outcome of the motivation and intent of the actor, the nature of the act itself, and the earthly consequences of the action. The actor is ultimately held responsible for his actions, not by the leader in the organization but by God Himself. This can be a rather upsetting concept and may prove to be somewhat threatening to those leaders who happen to read these pages. It has been interesting to note the responses to this concept among military leaders over the past several months. Some strongly agree, some call it interesting, and some react violently and negatively. Those who react most negatively have generally been those most threatened by the concept when it is applied to their own individual behaviors.

How do we manage to find ourselves in a moral dilemma between meeting organizational demands and spiritual requirements? Walton⁵ offers a possible reason.

What, then has the Enlightenment produced? A short-hand answer would be this: a rationalist libertarian society. Lineaments of a libertarian society include the free market system with its emphasis on self-interest, profits and competition, representative government, social roles filled by autonomous professionals, a secularist civilization, a people who are self-critical and prepared to debate first principles. The dilemma of the American libertarian society is the fact that liberalism's traditional function, namely, criticism of the existing order, cannot go forward in the face of collapsing values and of collapsing institutions. Tearing down needs to be balanced, to say the least, with shoring up.

Walton's observations concerning values and the societal manipulations of those values that generate dilemmas may also be appropriate when applied against the military sub-society and its quest to change classical values in its attempts to mold itself to the society it preserves. Walton goes on to make the following comparison of values.

CLASSICAL WORLD VIEW OF VALUES
(Greco-Roman and Christianity)

MODERN WORLD VIEW OF VALUES
(Enlightenment Philosophy
and Science)

| | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Religious Faith | Religious Skepticism |
| (God Is) | (God Is Not-or May be) |
| Future-World Orientation | This-World Orientation |
| Ends (Teleological) | Means (Instrumental) |
| Mystery-to-Be-Accepted | Problems-to-Be-Solved |
| Centralized Authority | Diversified Authority |
| Language of Metaphor | Technical Terminology |
| Intuition | Rationalization |
| Religious Obedience | Religious Dissent |
| Blessed Are the Poor | Blessed Are the Prosperous |
| Sense of Community | Sense of Individualism |
| Charity | Self-Interest |
| Compassion | Survival-of-the-Fittest |
| Justice | Liberty |
| Status | Contract |
| Routine | Innovation |
| Individual Stability | Individual Mobility |
| Static Economy | Growth Economy |
| Just Price | Market Price |
| Cooperation | Competition |

A comparison of the classical and modern views of important values indicates a major difference in the two. Since ethics involves the study of morality and morality is based in Judeo-Christian values for our society, the dichotomy between the values upon which the society is based and the values practiced by that society presents a dilemma in its very comparison. The dilemma of the military organizational leader is in determining a path that will allow his survival in the contemporary world while practicing traditional or classical values. If he is to concern himself with the spiritual consequences of his actions, the ethical leader has no choice but to take the difficult option that leaves the permissive situational ethic behind while adapting a more personally demanding and challenging absolute ethic for a standard of behavior. "Ethics in the street is emotional, passionate, prophetic. This is the case whether you are talking about Christian or non-Christian ethics."⁶ Judeo-Christian ethics began in the street as a response to an amoral or immoral society. Basing personal behavior on spiritual values seems to be contrary to the natural impulses of man and requires more than an average amount of effort to carry out.

The hierarchy for ethical responsibility seems to have at least three dimensions: the personal, organizational, and spiritual. Figure 17 illustrates this relationship. The personal and organizational dimensions of ethical responsibility can almost be combined. The individual and self are the same, the family in the organizational context is the unit and the military, and society is the personalization of the nation. They are separated here because the individual has an organizational life and a

private life in addition to his spiritual life. All three dimensions require a balance if an individual is to function effectively as a person. Responsibility for ethical behavior starts not with the individual's




Figure 17. Dimensions of Ethical Responsibility

responsibility to self; rather, it begins with man's moral responsibility to God. Once that responsibility has been met, in the organizational dimension he can become concerned with meeting his ethical responsibilities to the nation, the military establishment, his unit, and himself, in that order. In his personal life, often he meets his moral responsibility to God, he can meet his ethical responsibilities to society, his family, and himself. In the organizational dimension, the priority of ethical responsibility is essential if the value of selfless service is to be maintained. If that hierarchy of responsibility is changed, selfless service becomes a euphemism for exploitation. If the priority for responsibility is not maintained in the person's personal life, selfishness and self-centeredness result. Each

person has his own personal relationship with God. In figure 17, this is shown as that existing between the soul and God. It is separate from all other behaviors and responsibilities. In all three dimensions, moral responsibility to God and His law must come first and ethical responsibility for meeting the needs of the self must be last. The problem is not in establishing that priority, rather, it is in living it.

Perhaps an example of an ethical dilemma in the personal dimension of responsibility would clarify the concept. The following story was related during an interview for the paper at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Following World War Two in Germany, there never seemed to be enough food to go around. We were often hungry and were in danger of starving. A mother I knew tried very hard to find ways to keep her children fed, but frequently she was unsuccessful. To keep them from starving she sometimes stole food from whatever source she could find. She knew that stealing was not right, but she felt that she had to keep the family from starving. Did she do the right thing? Was it moral or ethical to steal food to keep her family alive? I'm not quite sure.⁷

In making an analysis of the actions that took place in this example, it appears that the mother did violate a basic commandment that forbids theft. It would seem that the intentional violation of an ethical absolute would result in an unethical action. The motivation for the act must then be considered. She did not steal for herself; she stole for others in her family. She shared in the food, but perhaps would not have stolen if she had not felt the responsibility for preserving her family. The source from which she stole the food should not be an issue. There was only a limited amount of food available for the society, and that supply was insufficient to meet the needs of the people. One of the consequences of her theft was that someone else went hungry, someone else came just that much closer to

starvation. Does someone have the moral right to steal food to sustain the lives of their family members when that theft places the lives of others in jeopardy?

In this particular example, the mother's motives were good but in the stress of the moment she lost sight of her first responsibility to God for the ethicality of her conduct. She then placed her family's needs before the needs of others in society. She therefore failed in her ethical responsibilities to society. While her actions were understandable, they cannot be called ethical, either by standards established by a spiritual dimension or even by standards established by society. There is no way that the act of theft could have been declared right or good when measured against spiritual or societal ethical standards.

To illustrate the organizational dimension of ethical responsibility, the My Lai cover-up similarly failed to meet spiritual, national and military standards for ethical conduct. The commanding general's desire to protect his unit and himself from scorn and blame is again understandable, but cannot be considered to be ethical. The commanding general failed in his attempts to properly prioritize his responsibilities in the matter of telling the truth. It is not a new failure; leaders, even presidents, have experienced it repeatedly.

It is very easy to sit in an armchair, comfortable and well-fed, and make judgments about the ethicality of the behaviors of others when we are not experiencing the hungers and other pressures felt by those who had to make tough decisions under difficult circumstances. The morality of the issues involved only become muddy when the individuals faced with making tough decisions attempt to rationalize what they know to be unethical or immoral behavior because that behavior seems to be the easiest or most

expedient way to ease the intensity of the crisis. If society allows the actor to succeed in his unethical action, he is much more likely to engage in the same unethical behavior again under similar circumstances. Married persons who engage in extramarital affairs generally report that the first instance resulted in some guilt; each successive incident brought less and less guilt. What they fail to realize is that, while their behavior may go unnoticed by their spouses or by their society, their behavior cannot escape detection in the spiritual dimension. That is as true for adulterous conduct as it is for theft or for murder. When there is a problem of ethicality in one dimension of responsibility, there usually occurs a lessening in the person's ability to determine priorities of ethical responsibilities in other dimensions. That is because ultimately all dimensions of ethical responsibility place spiritual responsibility as their primary one. For persons to function effectively in all three dimensions they must recognize that spiritual responsibilities come first and that the common interests of society have priority over self-interests. These are the values that result in unquestionably ethical behavior and command climates that facilitate high performance systems while promoting rapid personal growth.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES

For ethical values to become meaningful in the organizational context, they must be identified by the leaders to be important for organizational success. This can be done by showing their relevance to organizational goal attainment. Subordinates must be told what values are important for the

organization's success and how those values meet and reinforce ethical standards.

The very reason for America's having a military force loses its validity if a ship's captain evinces no sense of moral obligation and decides not to be moral. A first sergeant betrays the military purpose of his underdeveloped moral imagination prevents his recognizing the ethical nature of an issue. A flight leader threatens American values if he cannot analyze a moral problem. A general officer damages the force that he ostensibly serves if he cannot deal fairly with differing ethical viewpoints. The morally impoverished military leader is an enemy of the constitution he has sworn to protect and defend.⁸

This quotation argues strongly for the need of all leaders at each organizational level to understand moral and ethical responsibilities and the values upon which they are based. It implies that each of these leaders has the responsibility to teach those values to subordinates. If subordinates are expected to learn moral responsibility and the values upon which they are based, leaders must do more than just teach. They must model moral and ethical behavior just as they must personify the values they hope to instill in others. "If they (leaders in the field) fail to provide exemplary moral leadership, no course in ethics can be expected to overcome the power of their bad example. Worse still, a failure of moral leadership at the command level can and often does introduce a moral cynicism that no class in ethics can possibly surmount."⁹

Teaching military ethics requires that the military virtues of loyalty, courage, obedience, integrity, and self-subordination be recognized as essential to the performance of the military leadership functions. Included among these virtues are the moral and ethical responsibilities addressed earlier, responsibilities that come with each of the virtues and values that leaders hope to develop among their subordinates. The positive nature of

military virtues often obscures the difficult responsibilities that they entail. Loyalties must be prioritized; courage often must be demonstrated by risking one's career, if not one's life, in the quest for moral right; obedience to moral responsibility may require disobedience of immoral orders; integrity means choosing the difficult but ethical course of action over the easier, more expedient one; and self-subordination means placing one's own welfare and career at the very end of all other considerations. It is far easier to pay superficial lip-service to those virtues than it is to live up to the responsibilities that they demand.

In teaching military ethics, Stromberg, Waken and Callahan suggest five goals. These are:

1. Stimulate moral imagination.
2. Recognize moral issues.
3. Develop analytical skills.
4. Elicit a sense of moral obligation and personal responsibility.
5. Tolerate - and resist - disagreement and ambiguity.

To stimulate the moral imagination of students/subordinates, teacher/leaders must discuss morality, its source, and its impact on demands placed on individuals for behaviors. Most leaders have difficulty discussing morality and its spiritual basis. It almost seems that in the philosophic discussion of morality, spirituality and their implications, leaders fear that they will somehow lessen their basis of authority through an acknowledgement of their requirement for subservience to greater moral responsibilities and principles. Perhaps the reluctance of many leaders to engage in discussion of morality and spirituality merely reflects their own need for a stimulation of their moral imaginations.

Everyone needs to learn to recognize moral and ethical issues and separate those from issues of poor leadership, inappropriate decisions, and ill-advised actions. Many, perhaps most, bad decisions are not unethical. We need to better differentiate between that which involves a moral or ethical issue and that which does not. In that recognition process, however, we must take into account all the possible consequences of an action, not just those that are immediate or short-term, prior to making final ethical determinations.

Analytical skills become necessary for determining the ethicality and morality of issues. The identification and prioritization of ethical responsibilities, the determination of individual motivations, and the study and projection of the consequences of an action all require these skills. To learn from examples from the past, those examples must be segmented to illustrate important concepts or to be tested against moral and ethical standards. Without analytic skills, leaders will find these tasks to be most difficult.

Primary among the goals of teaching military ethics must be the development among the students of a sense of moral obligation and personal responsibility for behaviors. The majority of this chapter has been focused on developing or enhancing in the reader an awareness of the scope of individual moral obligations and personal responsibility, to convince the reader that obligations and responsibilities for ethical behavior transcend immediate motives for and consequences of an action. This same concept needs to be developed in each of a leader's subordinates. The concept, or at least the values upon which that concept is based, is already present in those individuals. It must be drawn out and nurtured if it is to develop to meet the individual's and the organization's needs.

In all ethical teaching, the teacher must be prepared to tolerate disagreement and conflicting opinions without distorting his ethical message. Disagreements result from differences in value systems and experiences among students and teachers; ambiguity and other difficulties in prioritization or responsibilities may also result from attempts to rationalize past individual behaviors. Few people want to accept the fact that they may have acted immorally or unethically in the past. Resistance to concept acceptance may be a defensive reaction designed to legitimize past actions. Whatever the reason for the conflict, the teacher/leader must be alert for it and use it to make his teaching point. At times a group must agree to disagree on some issue. The important thing is not the disagreement but rather that the reasons for that disagreement are explored.

"Like any other organized program in the military, the teaching of ethics needs the earnest support of the commander if it is to survive and improve. Commanders, however, might well be wary. Few of them have ever studied ethics; the very introduction of the subject might imply to military leaders a questioning of their past judgments."¹⁰ Certainly a defensiveness among commanders would be dysfunctional to continued ethical development. What is required from all leaders is a willingness to learn from their experiences, even if they have been negative. Even more threatening than past judgments should be the thought of future judgments based on the same absence of moral and ethical understanding. The challenge for all leaders is to learn and grow, not to defend and stagnate.

CHAPTER 7

MORALITY, ETHICS AND WAR

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines war as a "... state of. . . open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations." Morality is defined as " . . . particular moral principles or rules of conduct; conformity to ideals of right human conduct." An ethic may be defined as a system of moral principles or values. When morality, ethics and war are discussed in conjunction with one another, the discussion must ultimately lead to an investigation of national compliance with principles or rules of conduct that will allow individual and corporate conformity to the ideals of moral human behavior while participating in an open and declared armed hostile conflict. Soldiers are asked to conform to rules of conduct that are in keeping with high moral standards while fighting in that armed conflict. What started out as three small words has expanded into a concept that encompasses all facets of conduct in war from individual behavior to national policy. Many books have been written on one or more of the subjects of morality, ethics and war and this inspection of those subjects certainly will not attempt to summarize the works that are available to the reader in any library. What will be investigated, however, are a number of considerations that military leaders and members of the society that the military serves may find of interest in their attempts to reconcile the implications of war with moral conduct.

Wars have been with us since the beginning of recorded time. Families, tribes, city-states and nations have fought among themselves for centuries over nearly every possible issue. History records wars fought over religious issues, suffrage issues, racial issues and the issues of greed

and avarice. In every conflict it is probable that each side was able to rationalize the rightness of its position and the wrongness of its opponent's. Nearly always some moral issue has been used to justify the mobilization of a nation for the purpose of waging war. The moral issue has generally remained an issue only as long as the hostilities lasted; after they ceased the moral issue has usually been quickly forgotten. Nations have not always been consistent in their selection of issues over which they go to war. England, which at one point in history had expanded from its island empire to the degree that it was said that the sun never set on the British Empire, went to war on several occasions when its European neighbors embarked on expansionist programs. This action was justified by the British at the time as being necessary for the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe, or perhaps for the maintenance of an imbalance of power. The results of each of history's wars have varied. Sometimes national boundaries have been adjusted or erased, on other occasions ethnic groups have been moved or exterminated. Occasionally political forms of government have changed as a result of the wars. Sometimes there have been no visible change resultant from the war; both sides have decided to allow the disagreement precipitating the conflict to become dormant or to continue at a lessened degree of intensity. The one thing that has remained constant in all wars has been the pain and death inflicted on the combatants and those families from whom the combatants are drawn. When great moral principles are upheld through a war, then the survivors on the winning side can take some comfort in the nobleness of their sacrifice. When there has been no clear winner or when no great moral principle has been upheld, the nobility of the sacrifice is more difficult to establish. For the losing side in a

conflict, there results a feeling of betrayal among the unsuccessful combatants as well as a feeling of frustration that comes from suffering without purpose. On both sides in a conflict, members of families who experienced the loss or mutilation of a loved one become the real losers. Both sides also have lost, especially in modern times, the natural resources squandered in the conduct of war. The fossil fuel used and destroyed during World War Two, for example, would probably have been sufficient to meet the fuel needs of a generation of people not at war. In terms of human resources, the potential social contributions of those persons who were killed are unmeasurable. Economic ruin that resulted from World War Two precipitated major changes in world political structures far sooner than had been planned. This rapid and significant political change created massive problems in newly-emerging nations and set the stage for two major war involvements for the United States. War has been costly in many dimensions; it has been productive in few.

For war to be considered moral, it must be conducted in compliance with rules of conduct that allow (and demand) individual and organizational conformity to the ideals of moral human behavior. The purpose of that war must be the pursuit of a moral objective. The operant word in the last sentence is "moral", not "noble." What is noble has a way of changing; what is moral remains constant. If the purpose of the war is not moral, then compliance with accepted rules of warfare cannot make it moral. The problem is in determining what a moral objective really is.

As a nation we seem to have evolved a perception that whatever we do internationally is in the best interests of the world. We are evangelistic in our projection of democracy as the ultimate political form of

government. We seem to tell ourselves that we know best what is good for other nations. With the clarity of hindsight, however, it might appear that we and our political systems have made many mistakes in judgment that have had serious political and moral long-term consequences. The division of Germany following World War Two has resulted in three generations of troops being committed to maintain an uneasy peace. When the Nazi party controlled Germany and its armies were threatening all of Europe, the overwhelming evil nature of that government detracted our attention from any concern we might have had over the evils of communism. The urgency of the moment led us to embrace the Soviets as allies in the noble venture of defeating the Axis powers. We had no concern then for the blood baths that had eliminated much of the senior Soviet military leadership. We had no concern for Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania; or that Soviet aggression was overlooked in our drive to destroy Hitler and his war machine. The price of our overlooking the aims of communism in the Soviet Union was the loss of half of Europe, first in occupation, then in satellite countries. The dividing of an ethnic people along arbitrary lines for the purpose of occupation was perhaps the action with the most far-reaching consequence. The division of the occupation of Germany, accomplished to insure that the country would not precipitate a war in Europe for the third time in a century, has ultimately resulted in a cold war that has brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster on several occasions.

At the same time a group of men were dividing Europe for post-war occupation, Korea was divided for occupation after the defeat of Japan. The Koreans were not consulted. The country was divided along an arbitrary line that severed a cohesive ethnic group. The communists occupied the north and established a communist government. We established a democratic government

in the south. Was the war that followed a war of communist expansion or one fought to unify an ethnic people? The approved answer may depend on which side in the conflict is asked. What is sure is that what seemed like a good solution to a problem eventually precipitated a war and innumerable incidents costing American lives from the end of the Korean War through the present. Even the form of government in the south has been open to the question. During much of the time American troops have served in South Korea to defend democracy, the government of South Korea has been a military dictatorship or some form of government established along those lines.

Although dividing an ethnic group along arbitrary lines for political purposes failed in its aims on two occasions, when the French were ousted from Indo-China we again were participants in dividing a country, this time Vietnam. We agreed to sponsor democratic elections throughout the country in 1956 to allow the Vietnamese to determine their own form of government. We had supported Ho Chi Minh against the Japanese during World War Two; perhaps the expectation was that in spite of his communist ideology the Vietnamese would choose a democratic government. Whatever the reasoning, when the time for elections drew near it became clear that Ho and communism would be the overwhelming choice of the Vietnamese people. The concept of a democratically-elected communist government was unacceptable to the leaders in the United States, so the elections were stopped and the Republic of South Vietnam was established, a nation governed during most of its existence by military strongmen and others who were intent on self-service rather than serving the people. The cost in American lives and other resources to support the unethical decision not to live up to our agreement to support a national election in 1956 has been very high.

The purpose of these preceeding paragraphs has not been to point out the political mistakes of the United States; rather, it has been to illustrate that long-term consequences for expedient political actions are not always predictable and that what may appear today to be ethical, or at least not unethical, may become increasingly unethical with the passage of time. When power is projected beyond out national boundaries we stop serving the society of the nation and start serving the society of the world. If that service is in keeping with the desires of the society of the world, then that service is moral if the purpose, actions, and consequences are moral. If that service is not in keeping with the desires of the society of the world, then the morality of that service is open to serious question. The seductive qualities of power projection can lead people, organizations, and nations to rationalize actions taken in pursuit of a desirable end and to overlook the moral and ethical implications of these rationalized actions. There exists a danger that what are considered to be strategic interests requiring power projection may not be strategic interests at all. They may be rationalizations for present or future projections of power. Hitler may have rationalized his actions on the basis that the safety of Germany required a German-dominated Europe, and that the German people needed space in which to grow. The Soviet Union may see Soviet security as the result of Soviet world domination. We may see our national security as being contingent upon a ring of nuclear weapons around the Soviet Union to contain their expansionistic tendencies. These may all be rationalizations for the projection of power.

To determine when the use of military force is moral, it is necessary to put aside the stirring slogans of the day and examine closely the purpose,

actions, and consequences of the projection of power through force of arms. We need to look objectively at the situation and put passions aside. We once said that a strong Germany was a prelude to war; we now say that a strong Germany is essential for peace. We once said that all communism is evil; we now do business regularly with Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, China, and other communist nations. We once said that we could not tolerate a communist mainland China. We now recognize that government instead of the Nationalist Chinese government on Formosa. We once said that we could not live with a communist Vietnam; we now live with not only a communist Vietnam but a communist Laos and Cambodia as well. The truth is that we can tolerate a lot of things that we think we cannot and that everything we think is intolerable is not necessarily a threat to our national security.

From a moral absolutist's point of view, the only moral use of force would be in the defense of a nation's boundaries and the constitution that governs that nation. Does that mean that such a conflict would have to be fought on that nation's soil? Perhaps that would not be necessary as long as the threat to the sovereignty of that nation were real; the problem with determining the morality of a war fought on other than that nation's soil is in determining the validity of the threat. Was Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a threat to the security of the United States? Our government decided that it was not. Was Argentina's takeover of the Falkland Islands a threat to the United States? Again our government thought that it was not, although it chose to support the British attempt to recapture the islands. Was the introduction of Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba a threat to our nation? President Kennedy thought that it was, and he brought us as close as we have even been to nuclear war. That he was right in his assessment

can be confirmed by the fact that the Soviets recognized the legitimacy of the argument and withdrew the threat.

What about our deployment of missiles around the world, and specifically around the Soviet Union? If we can justify on moral grounds taking the nation to the brink of nuclear war because foreign missiles were deployed within range of important military installations and major United States population centers, could not the Soviets also claim moral justification for an international showdown based on our deployment of nuclear missiles within range of similar targets in the Soviet Union? If a standard for the measurement of the morality or ethicality of an action is to be valid, it must be applicable to both, or perhaps all, sides in a dispute. We have maintained over the years that, in the case of our missile deployments, the force is present for deterrence or retaliation and not for preemptive nuclear strike purposes. The Soviets, always suspicious, could counter that only the United States has used nuclear weapons in combat, and that the use of those weapons at that time was not in response to a similar use by the enemy force. The long-term consequence of an action that appeared to be well-advised in 1945 has come back to haunt us in the cold war. It is very difficult to defend an action of our own on moral grounds when we condemn a similar action of a potential opponent on moral grounds. The differentiation between those actions must then be made on the perception of intent behind those actions. Perceptions, as we know, may not always be highly correlated with reality. Figure 18 illustrates the considerations and judgments required to determine the morality of an action. The intent of an action; the objective of the action; the conduct of the nation, the organization, and the individuals in the organization; and the short, long-term, and spiritual consequences of an action must all be moral if the action is to be moral. If, at any point between intent and consequences, a

moral test fails, then the action is immoral. An immoral act conducted to attain a moral objective makes the attainment of the objective immoral. The




Figure 18. Test for Moral Action

ends do not justify the means. Villainy conducted to eliminate villainy perpetuates villainy and the difference between opponents becomes none.

The test for morality is a difficult one, and it should be. The use of force is an act of desperation, an act to be taken cautiously, and after the careful deliberation of the issues involved. Indiscriminate use of force is the characteristic of the bully, be it an individual or a nation. Bullies may be tolerated, but when they develop a weakness they are fallen upon by others and destroyed. Few mourn the passing of the bully.

No political system of government has endured unchanged in a single country. National boundaries change, either as the result of war or by the consent of people living in the area. The nature of governments change during the period of their existence. When government becomes too repressive or repugnant to the society it governs, the people revolt and

change forms of government. When a nation's neighbor become too aggressive, other nations band together to dissuade the aggressor. Some nations maintain long traditions of government and foreign policy, others seem to change both on a regular basis. Vast empires become multiple independent nations and small nations band together to become one large nation. Dictatorships become democracies and then dictatorships again. Time, special situations and the need of the people all combine to dictate governmental change. This change will take place, with or without external intervention. External intervention only changes the timetable.

With the ability to project power beyond national boundaries comes the temptation to effect political change in other nations, especially when the policies and practices of those nations are in conflict with our own. We are tempted to make changes because we believe existing systems would be repugnant to us and therefore must be repugnant to those who live under them. It is possible to lose sight of the requirement for people to change their own forms of government when they no longer meet the needs of the people being governed. The Greeks, inventors of democracy, have spent relatively little of their existence under that form of government. The early attempts at French democracy were short-lived. In the United States, where the democratic form of government has existed for two hundred years (a short period of time when compared to other national histories), there tends to be a sense of urgency to make changes now. That need may be a reflection of our society that demands instant gratification. It may also be a need to share what works for us with others. It may be a combination of factors, all of which argue for making changes in other forms of government now, without waiting, in the pursuit of some moral principle. Whatever the

reason, the change that we support may be more to meet our needs than to meet the needs of others. Talking about the need for respecting human rights in other nations may keep us from focusing on the need for improved human rights at home. History has shown us that man has yet to discover an enduring form of government. Ours may be no exception, especially if we are tempted by our own successes to abandon the moral basis for the projection of power. We cannot do something merely because we have the power to do it and expect to remain unchallenged. The Romans tried it and failed. All other great empires have tried the "might makes right" theory and have found it to be invalid.

The projection of military power beyond our borders to intervene in the disputes of other nations can be a very positive and moral action if the projection of that power prevents or stops active hostilities. To be placed in the position of having to shed blood to prevent bloodshed, however, does not seem to make good sense. Our military intervention in Vietnam did nothing to change what would have been the outcome of the 1956 elections in that country but it resulted in more than 50,000 American deaths and a quarter of a million American wounded, to say nothing of Vietnamese, Australian and Korean casualties. Collateral damage included the pain and suffering of the families of those who were casualties in that war. Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome is still being experienced by significant numbers of veterans and the society is still mindful of the actions at Kent State and elsewhere. Being able to project power does not guarantee the ability to use power effectively to bring about the desired outcome. It does not guarantee that the projected power will be adequate to meet the demands placed upon it. Being able to project power also does not make the

act right, necessary, or moral. Those factors must be established prior to the projection of power, not as a rationalization for an act that has taken place.

The protection of the sovereignty and rights of others is a noble cause. Those who have studied religious teachings remember that we have been enjoined to be our brother's keeper, to look out for him, to help and to guide him. To be our brother's keeper we must be a keeper to all of our brothers, not just those whose maintenance presents some special advantage to us. If we are to establish ourselves as the military policemen of the world, we must be as active in Afghanistan as we are in El Salvador, as willing to go to war over outside influence in some emerging nation in Africa as we are over Soviet intervention in Cuba. We cannot justify an action on a moral basis in one part of the world if we are not willing to take a similar action under similar circumstances in another part of the world that does not offer us as many advantages. Selective morality is no morality at all.

Clearly the United States does not have the manpower nor the resources required to police the world. That being the case, for the use of force to have any moral basis, that force must be used to maintain the sovereignty of the nation. The maintenance of that sovereignty may require the projection of military power beyond its boundaries, but only in the pursuit of interests vital to the maintenance of the nation. Those are strategic interests. If military power is projected beyond the nation's borders for reasons other than to protect interests essential to the maintenance of the nation, it is very difficult to justify that action on moral grounds. Intervention in El Salvador is difficult to justify on moral grounds if similar intervention is not made everywhere else in the world where a

similar circumstance exists. The same set of circumstances cannot create a moral demand in one geographic area and not in another.

To test a course of action for a moral basis, figure 18 may prove to be useful. In the Cuban missile crisis, for instance, the intent of the action was to remove the threat to the United States from medium-range Soviet nuclear weapons based in Cuba. This was a moral intent, since it was to protect the nation projecting the power. The objective of the action was to cause the missiles to be removed. This was a moral objective in that it did not dictate changes in the political form of government of Cuba or the Soviet Union, call for the death of a leader, or require the commitment of troops in armed conflict. The call for removal of the missiles offered an alternative to war. The conduct of the nation, the military organization and the individuals in the military and in government was above reproach. The consequences of the action, as far as we know, were the removal of the missile threat, the reinforcement of the perception among nations of the world that we were serious about the defense of our nation, and the projection of the perception that we did not have to go to war to defend the nation, but that we had to be prepared to go to war over national security matters. Having passed all of the tests, it is probable that President Kennedy's action on behalf of the nation was a moral action.

An action that may not emerge from the test quite as favorably is the annexation of Indian lands in the nineteenth century. The intent of the action was to open new land for settlement and to exploit resources, intents that are not immoral until the fact that by treaty the land belonged to someone else is entered into the equation. The great mineral wealth to be found in the area and the promise of financial gain clouded the immorality

of the theft of the land from the Indians and led to all sort of rationalizations for the taking of the land. The intent of the action was immoral; therefore the action itself was immoral. The objective of the action was the acquisition of the land, an objective that required the destruction or removal of the Indians, an immoral objective. Incidents like Wounded Knee, the Harrington raid, and national violation of treaties leave little doubt that conduct at all levels must be considered to have been immoral. The consequences of the action included the theft of the land, the near-destruction of the Indians, and a reinforcement of the acceptability of using force to satisfy greed. It reinforced the concept of provoking an incident to justify massive retaliation. In the process of justifying the theft of the lands, the Indian was de-humanized in the minds of the public and this dehumanization set the stage for the shameful treatment of the Indian that persists in some places in this nation to this day. There does not seem to be much justification for labeling this action as being moral.

The fire bombings of World War Two may fall somewhere between the two previous examples in terms of morality. The intent of the action was to shorten the war through the lessening of the capability of the enemy war machine to produce the weapons of war. That intent would not seem to be immoral. The objective of the action was to destroy the factories producing war material, a moral objective. The conduct of the military and civilian leaders may be questionable. Certainly the crews that flew the missions conformed to the rules of war. If the military leaders targeted known factories producing war materiel, then their actions were moral. If they targeted cities relying on total destruction of an area to destroy the target, then their conduct was immoral. The consequences of their action

included the destruction of the military target, but also included were the destruction of tens of thousands of civilians, much personal property, schools, hospitals, cultural centers, and churches. The action reinforced a concept that the destruction of a civilian population is acceptable if a military objective is accomplished. The morality of the firebombing must therefore be questionable at best, and at worst it must be recognized as a euphemism for mass murder.

The question might be asked, was the involvement of the United States in World War Two a moral involvement? If it was not, then the actions that took place during the war could not have been moral. The intrigues and manipulations that led to the attack on Pearl Harbor are many and complicated. The involvement in the European conflict came as a result of a declaration of war by Germany. The examples used in this chapter are used to illustrate concepts and not to second-guess the actions of those persons in positions of power decades ago. For that reason, the morality of involvement in World War Two is not addressed. That it occurred is reason enough to use actions it precipitated as illustrations.

Man has historically used the work of others as a basis for new or expanded works. International interaction is no exception. Once a concept has been used it becomes easy to perpetuate, and with each success in its use it comes closer to attaining the status of a political truth. When the concept reaches the point of attaining truth status, one is tempted to test for morality using the political truth as a standard of measurement rather than to use moral principles as standards. The projection of power and the justification for the act have fallen into this trap.

In an attempt to achieve a desired end, we often overlook the moral implications of the means we choose to reach those ends. We have come up with rationalizations such as, "You can't make an omlette without breaking some eggs." The cliché is somehow supposed to make the use of immoral actions acceptable, even moral. We are deluding ourselves. In a conflict with an immoral opponent, the difference between the hero and the villain is the morality or immorality of the actions of the combatants. The morality of an action is the single discriminator between the two. To use evil to defeat evil is to become evil. We do not excuse deviant behavior from a child because the child says that someone else did the same thing to him. We preach a simple truth to the child that two wrongs do not make a right. If this holds true for individual behavior, it should also hold true for collective behavior, even among nations. The fact that an immoral act has been perpetuated against us does not make our retaliation in kind a moral act. What the retaliation does is lower our moral standards to those of the original perpetrator of the act, eliminating the moral difference between opponents. Revenge is foreign to the entire concept of Christian morality. "Jesus not only eliminates the whole idea of revenge, but he strikes also at the feeling which wants revenge and, again using the technique of counteractive behavior, would have the desire for revenge replaced by a desire for the other person's good."¹ It is reported that the first aerial bombing of population center in England during World War Two was accidental and that the subsequent bombing of German cities was retaliatory. The effect was a German shift in bombing targets from military targets to population centers, which in turn allowed the British to gather military strength and solidify public support for the war. The fact that

the action led to a desirable conclusion for us does not make the act a moral one.

Today we are engaged in a policy of nuclear deterrence that has nations involved in complex alliances for support against conflicting ideologies. Both sides have the opponent labeled a potential aggressor and both sides can document incidents to justify their label for the other. The Americans and other free-world nations point to Soviet interventions in Hungary, Poland, Afghanistan and other nations as confirmation of a Soviet policy for eventual world domination. The Soviets likewise point to American use of nuclear weapons in World War Two, the involvement in the Vietnam war, The Bay of Pigs, and American covert operations in Central and South America as indications that the United States is following a policy of imperialism and is willing to use nuclear weapons to achieve its purposes. The truth of the accusation is not relevant; the important factor is that the argument is being used to solidify public opinion in the Soviet Union and other Soviet block nations.

Both sides in the conflict have enough nuclear weapons in their arsenals to destroy each other several times over. We justify the maintenance of our arsenal on the concept that the Soviets must be convinced that, if they employ first-use of strategic nuclear weapons, enough weapons systems will survive the attack to destroy the attacker. The concept also holds that our very strength is the factor that prevents an attack from the Soviets and that a show of weakness would be an open invitation for attack. Certainly history has validated this part of the concept.

In the days when legions lined up and fought until one side emerged victorious, it was possible for those persons who wanted nothing to do with

the carnage of war to seek safety away from the battle area. Civilians were not forced to be part of the battle. It seems that a war fought between armed combatants in an environment in which only the combatants are likely to become casualties stands a better chance of passing the test for morality than would a war in which non-combatant were subjected to the same or greater dangers than the combatants. In a strategic nuclear war, the targets are located largely in population centers. Factories that produce the weapons of war also require people to work in those factories, people who have no desire to engage in war. We can talk forever about servicing targets and surgical nuclear strikes; the fact remains that in a nuclear exchange millions of women, children, and male non-combatants will be killed, most certainly against their wills. It will be most difficult to accurately label such an action as being moral.

In the event of a strategic nuclear strike of large scale against the United States, one must wonder about the morality of a policy of massive retaliation. If the estimates are correct that the United States could suffer 100 million casualties in the first attack, it would seem that destruction of that magnitude would guarantee our inability to win the conflict. Retaliation would then be revenge, an attack designed to inflict pain with no chance of winning the conflict, much as a rabid dog bites anything that is close, without reason. Large nuclear stockpiles may be moral as a deterrence, but there seems to be no moral justification for their use in a counter-strike.

There appears to be some evidence that a strategic nuclear exchange could create a cloud of nuclear debris that would act as a shield against

the sun's rays and which could precipitate another Ice Age.² Were this to occur, those nations not a party to the conflict would suffer catastrophically for the actions of the antagonists. Radiation, fallout, and the like would also affect the entire world. One cannot be the brother's keeper if one's actions resulted in the brother's destruction. If we persist in a policy of retaliatory nuclear strikes, then we must abandon the justification of this policy on moral grounds. Retaliation may be expedient and it may be understandable. It may even be necessary. What it is not is moral. If we use strategic nuclear weapons in retaliation for a similar strike on the United States, we should not fear for the survival of our leaders; rather, we should fear for the survival of our souls.

We are deadlocked in a concept that encourages nuclear proliferation and continued high levels of international tension. With each passing day the probability of a nuclear accident that could precipitate a nuclear retaliation and total war increases. This situation has evolved from longstanding mistrust and intentional or unintentional misinterpretation of events. It also results from an international competition for allies. What started as a glaring at each other across a fence has developed into a nuclear standoff with sometimes unsteady hands poised over the nuclear "start" button. If the situation is to improve, an initiative must be taken somewhere. The existing pattern of thought and behavior must be broken and a new one, based firmly in moral principle, must be established. What is called for is not another of the myriad adjustments in policy that has characterized the past four decades; a radical change is required.

If we are to develop a viable, moral policy for the use of force in the defense of our nation, at least seven basic actions must be taken. These actions are:

1. Determine the primary national objective.
2. Determine the nation's strategic interests.
3. Determine the threats to the nation's objective and its strategic interests.
4. Devise a force tailored to counter those threats.
5. Establish a mechanism to continually reassess the threats.
6. Adjust the composition of the counter force as new data indicate a need for adjustment.
7. Constantly evaluate the moral and ethical implications of policy.

For years it seems that we have added to that policy that has been made before and searched for appropriate missions for the military in light of new developments. Perhaps it is time to step back and objectively assess our moral responsibilities in international politics.

DETERMINE THE PRIMARY NATIONAL OBJECTIVE. This primary national objective must be the maintenance of the geographic boundaries of the nation and the form of government by which it is ruled. Implied is the need to defend the boundaries and the government from all internal and external threats. All other interests must be secondary to this. Responsibilities to the people of the nation should probably take precedence over responsibilities to the people of other nations. Care must be taken in determining national responsibilities outside the boundaries of the nation. Self-determination has long been the basis for our own existence and we should insure that we allow others that same opportunity. Whether this

should involve military intervention with a third power is a matter open for discussion. We must first insure that we do not violate the right of another nation to determine its own destiny. Intervention with yet another power to assist that second nation in exercising its right to choice must be carefully examined for moral implications. Do we want to be policemen for the nations of the world? If we hope to call conflict with one nation to insure the freedom of choice in another a moral responsibility, then we must meet that responsibility everywhere in the world. To do otherwise is to subscribe to a theory of selective morality. Does a conflict with our nation to protect another place the lives and property of others at risk? If the defense of a free Federal Republic of Germany meant that the United States and the Soviet Union would ultimately engage in a strategic nuclear exchange that would destroy large portions of the world, including nations not involved in the conflict, how moral would the defense of freedom for another nation (in this case, the Federal Republic of Germany) really be? We must always remember the primary objective of the nation and the responsibilities attendant to it. Actions that do not support that objective cannot be ethical or moral.

DETERMINE THE NATION'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS. In order to maintain the independence and geographic integrity of the nation, there are certain actions and interests that should be identified as essential. Unrestricted use of air and sea lanes may be required for the maintenance of our national economy. An uninterrupted flow of oil may be required for national defense. Perhaps the maintenance of free, independent governments on our borders is essential for our own freedom and independence. Whatever the interest, for it to be strategic it must directly affect the ability of this

nation to maintain its boundaries and its independence. If there is an alternative course of action reasonably available, the interest is not strategic. If the interest is not absolutely essential to the maintenance of the country, it is not strategic. One of our greatest temptations in recent years has been to label national and important issues "strategic." The projection of military power beyond national boundaries is warranted in the defense of a strategic interest, since the fate of the nation is in the balance. If one labels a non-strategic interest "strategic" or does not change the status of a strategic interest when it no longer conforms to the definition, then one can seemingly legitimize the projection of military power beyond national boundaries in defense of these secondary interests. The maintenance of an independent South Vietnam was not a strategic interest nor is the maintenance of an independent Israel. As long as we are dependent on oil to maintain our national defense, the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Arab and other oil-producing nations of the world may be a strategic interest. While the projection of military power to defend the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany may not have a moral basis because we are unwilling to take the same action for Afghanistan or Laos, the projection of power to remove a Soviet missile threat from Cuba may have a moral basis because the security of the nation is directly threatened.

DETERMINE THE THREAT TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVE AND ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS. Once the nation's objectives and its strategic interests have been identified, all possible threats to those interests must be analyzed. If open sea lanes are essential, any threat to those sea lanes must be examined to determine as accurately as possible exactly what constitutes the threat. Abstract concepts must be made concrete. It is impossible to

counter a communist ideology calling for the overthrow of capitalism simply by fielding an army. It is, however, possible to defend against soldiers, submarines, missiles, and the like. It is even possible to counter diplomatic initiatives. The key is in accurately identifying the threats.

DEVISE A FORCE TAILORED TO COUNTER THOSE THREATS. Over the years the military has seemed to move from being a force designed for a specific purpose to being a force searching for missions to justify expansions in one area or another. Because the military has been given so many diverse missions not directly related to maintaining the independence of the United States and the strategic interests essential to that continued national independence, it is not equipped to do any very well. We maintain enough troops in Germany and Korea to get ourselves embroiled in a conflict to maintain the sovereignty of nations not essential for the defense of our own nation but we do not have sufficient air or water transport to quickly reinforce those forces should they ever be called upon to go to war. Forces in the United States are plagued by personnel shortages and turbulence that significantly diminish the capabilities of military organizations to perform their primary combat functions. It may be time to stop the patch-up approach to reorganization and design a force specifically to meet the real military needs of the nation. Any such attempt would be useless, however, until a realistic and accurate assessment of the threats to the nation and its strategic interests is completed. If we cannot support forces overseas in wartime, then those forces should be brought home where they can be supported. We can have no moral obligation to send a force that cannot be supported outside the boundaries of the nation, for the immorality

of the implications of that action is overwhelming. Human sacrifice is no longer an appropriate option.

ESTABLISH A MECHANISM TO CONTINUALLY REASSESS THE THREATS. Assessment must never stop, because situations are everchanging. The threat to the security of the nation does not change significantly from day to day, but it can change significantly over a period of several days. When those changes in threat occur, we must take the next step, to change the defense.

ADJUST THE COMPOSITION OF THE COUNTER FORCE AS NEW DATA INDICATE A NEED FOR ADJUSTMENT. On a tactical level we have been doing this for years. Battalions have been tailored to perform a specific mission while strategic organizations have remained essentially unchanged. We need to become much more flexible in our thinking and responsive in our actions if we are to field a combat force that can meet and defeat a threat to the nation or to its strategic interests.

CONSTANTLY EVALUATE THE MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLICY. As situations change, implications change. When divisions were first sent to occupy Germany, the mission and the threat was significantly different from today. Somehow our being there has become institutionalized over those decades since the end of War War Two. We are no longer the most potent land force west of the border with East Germany. The West Germans are. Their economy is stronger than ours. Service in their armed forces is strictly for the defense of their homeland. Why do we still have troops there that stand a good chance of being destroyed should a large-scale war occur? What are the moral implications of keeping a vulnerable force in the field?

A discussion took place not long ago between a civilian lawyer and a senior armored force commander. The lawyer was degrading the value of the

M-1 tank to the military and to the nation because of its expense. The tanker was defending the tank based on its capabilities and the moral obligation of the nation to send its soldiers into combat with the best equipment that technology has devised. The lawyer said that it was really a matter of what was an acceptable risk for the soldiers. He thought that an overhaul of the twenty-year old M-60 series tank was a viable alternative. The tanker suggested that it might not be so viable if the lawyer's son were serving in the older tank. The lawyer said that the tanker was getting emotional, to which the tanker responded that war was by definition emotional, the final desperate act after reason had failed. Too frequently, those who determine what is an acceptable risk for soldiers are in absolutely no danger of ever having to take that risk. It is human nature to be willing to accept greater danger levels for others than for ourselves. The greedy are always willing to let others use hand-me-downs. If we are to make a meaningful attempt to instill moral and ethical values into the military organization through its leadership, then we must constantly seek a new awareness of the morality and ethicality of the demands we place on the organization and its leaders. We cannot simply place ethics as an obscure subset of the leadership function. We must instead continue to develop a capability for moral assessment among the members of the military and demand conformity with absolute standards of behavior. Anything less will signal a decline in ethical behavior in organizational leadership.

The majority of those subjects discussed in this chapter are clearly beyond the bounds of military leaders to change by themselves. Matters of national policy are not and should not be determined by military leaders. They do have, however, the moral responsibility to advise and influence

those who do have the power to make these important national policy decisions. Military leaders are active in the National Security Council, the intelligence community, in Congress, and in the executive branch of government. They are charged with the responsibility for voicing their concerns over moral and ethical issues and for advising civilian policy-makers in matters pertaining to national security matters. Military leaders cannot submit to policies and orders that are immoral or unethical in their view and still fulfill their moral responsibilities to the nation. The military leader must break the longstanding tradition of unquestioning obedience and adapt a position of moral responsibility if the moral and ethical climate for leadership in the military and the nation is to improve.

Chapter Notes

Chapter 1

1. Becton, J. W., LTG, "My Philosophy of Command," in the United States Army Command and General Staff College Reference Book 22-4, Contemporary Readings in Military Leadership, 1983.
2. House, J., MAJ, in an interview with the author at Ft. Leavenworth, KS on 5 December 1983.
3. Stromberg, P.; Wakin, M.; and Callahan, D. The Teaching of Ethics in the Military. Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Hastings Institute, 1982, p. 66.
4. McCotter, O. L., COL, in an interview with the author at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, in August 1983.
5. Becton, J. W. op. cit.

Chapter 2

1. Hartjen, R. C., LTC. "Ethics in Leadership," in Soldier Support Journal, Vol. 9, July/August 1982.
2. French, J. and Raven, B. "The Bases of Social Power," in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds.) Group Dynamics, NY: Harper and Row, 1968. French and Raven identified five basis for power: Reward, Coercive, Referent, Expert, and Legitimate.
3. Source withheld by the author.
4. This method of goal attainment is frequently referred to as the Task Approach Management Model. A discussion of different management models can be found in Hartjen's Human Relations in the Military Environment, chapter 5.
5. Source withheld by the author.
6. "Leadership in the '70's", USAWC, 1970.
7. A leadership survey was conducted in 1978-79 among officers at Fort Riley, KS to measure factors influencing stress, motivation and ethical perceptions. The Human Resources Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAADMINCEN, Fort Harrison, IN was the agency after the proponency for the Leadership in the 70's Monograph Series was moved from the USAWC to the USAADMINCEN.

8. Forty officers in the ranks of LTC and COL stationed at Fort Leavenworth, KS; Fort Hood, TX; and Fort Harrison, IN were verbally queried from a prepared list of questions. Responses were examined to determine trends but no attempt was made to test for statistical significance.

Chapter 3

1. This incident took place in the tank battalion commanded by the author in 1982. The drill sergeant was relieved from duty, punished, and transferred to other duties outside the training brigade. The remaining drill sergeants supported the action.

2. Bradley, O. N., General of the Army. A Soldier's Story. NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1951, pp 472-3. Patton, G. S. War As I Knew It. Booton: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1947, pp 190-1.

3. Hartjen, R. C., LTC. Human Relations in the Military Environment. Indianapolis: USA Administration Center, 1978.

4. Greenfield, G., Sc D. "Self-Concept, the Hidden Variable." Unpublished paper presented to AMEDS Psychology Conference, San Antonio, TX, 1975.

5. O'Meara A. P., COL, in an interview with the author at Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 1983.

6. Karsten, P. Law, Soldiers, and Combat. Westport, Connecticut: The Greenwood Press, 1978, p. 73.

7. Hersey, R. E. and Blanchard, T., Rear Admiral (USNR, Ret). Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977, pp. 237-241.

8. Jourard, S. M. Ph.D. The Transparent Self. NY: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1971.

Chapter 4

1. Hartjen, R. C., LTC. Enlistment Completion Indicators - Armor. Indianapolis: USA Administration Center, 1978.

2. Ulmer, W., LTG. In an interview with the author on 5 March 1984. Information pertaining to the command climate was also gathered from interviews with Colonel Roy Ray, III Corps G-1, and Colonel Kent Harrison, Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; from interviews with numerous subordinate commanders and staff officers, and from a III Corps report dated November 1983 on Command Climate. Much of the data used in this chapter came from that report.

3. Babad, E. Y. and Solomon, G. "Professional Dilemmas of the Psychologist in an Organizational Emergency, "in American Psychologist, vol. 33, no. 9, September 1978, pp. 840-6.

4. Ulmer, W., LTG. op. cit.

5. Harrison, K., COL. op. cit.

Chapter 5

1. Gabriel, R. A. To Serve With Honor. Westport, CT: The Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 178.

2. Kant, I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959.

3. Gabriel, R. A. op. cit., p. 49.

4. St. Paul's letter to the Romans, ch. 5, vs. 12-21.

5. Toner, J. "Sisyphus as a Soldier: Ethics, Exigencies and the American Military," Parameters, 7, No. 4 (1977) as quoted in Gabriel, op. cit., p. 180.

6. Gabriel, R. A., op. cit., p. 184.

7. Zierdt, W. H. III. Unpublished instructional notes, USMA, 1972.

8. Gabriel, R. A. op. cit., p. 188. Additionally, other courses of action discussed in this chapter are identified in this reference.

Chapter 6

1. Walton, C. C. (ed.). The Ethics of Corporate Conduct. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1977, pp 22-4.

2. Names of the officers have been withheld by the author. Interview was conducted in March 1983.

3. Developed as a result of conversations with MAJ J. House and Chaplain (MAJ) E. Wichner at Ft. Leavenworth, KS in February 1984.

4. Dramesi, J. A. LTC. Code of Honor. NY: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc, 1975 and Plum, C. LTCOMDR. I'm No Hero. Independence, Mo: Independence Press, 1973, among others.

5. Walton, C. C. op. cit., p. 16-17.
6. Mullins, T. Y. God's Word and Contemporary Ethics. Philadelphia: Lutheran Church Press, no date given, pp. 16-17.
7. Wichner, E. in an interview with the author, March 1984.
8. Stromberg, P. L.; Wakin, M. M.; Callahan, D. The Teaching of Ethics in the Military. Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Institute, 1982, p. 3.
9. Ibid, p. 48.
10. Ibid, p. 72-3.

Chapter 7

1. Mullins, T. Y. God's Word and Contemporary Ethics. Philadelphia: Lutheran Church Press, no date given, p. 55.
2. Rankin, W. W. Countdown to Disaster. Cincinnati: Forward Movement Publications, 1981.

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